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This dissertation studies institutional investment in U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs). The 
first essay examines institutional investing preferences in U.S. banks and the impact of expansion 
of bank power on the preferences. Institutional investors prefer BHCs that hold more liquid assets, 
are better capitalized and larger in size, have better loan quality, lower stock return volatility and 
less derivative trading. In addition, the expansion of bank power is welcomed by various types of 
institutional investors, except for long-term institutions. Institutional investors also become less 
risk-averse when investing in BHCs that have expanded into non-banking business. However, the 
increased complexity and opaqueness of banks makes it harder for institutional investors to 
implement informative tradings, though grey and long-term institutions are less adversely affected 
than independent and short-term institutions.  
The second essay focuses on the 2008 financial crisis and investigates the under-researched 
area “the role of institutional investors in financial industry during crisis time”. It provides 
evidence that grey institutions (i.e. banks and insurance companies) have more information about 
banks’ risk exposure to securitization than do independent institutions (e.g. investment companies 
and public pension funds) as they shy away from banks with high risk exposure to securitization 
market, such as BHCs that hold more private-label MBS or BHCs that issue riskier securitization 
deals before the crisis. In addition, the trading of grey institutions before the crisis can also predict 
high-exposure banks’ abnormal returns around the Lehman Bankruptcy and is related to such 
banks’ operating performance during the crisis period. 
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Chapter 1. The Impact of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: Evidence from 
Institutional Investment in U.S. Banks 
1.1 Introduction 
Institutional investors have emerged as significant players in the capital market. They discipline 
managers either directly through proxy proposals and private negotiations (Song and Szewczyk 
(2003)) or indirectly through trading (Edmans and Manso (2011) and Chang, Lin, and Ma (2014)). 
Many studies have looked into the investment preferences of institutional investors and have found 
evidence that institutional investors prefer to make “prudent investments”. For example, Del 
Guercio (1996) shows that many institutional investors tilt their portfolios to stocks that are viewed 
as prudent investments. Bushee and Noe (2000) suggest that institutional investors prefer firms 
with better disclosure rankings to reduce monitoring costs.  Gompers and Metrick (2001) find that 
institutional investors prefer stocks of larger companies. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) suggest 
that institutions avoid firms that do not pay dividends, because a “prudent” stock should have a 
history of stable dividend payments. Giannetti and Simonov (2006) show that both foreign and 
domestic financial institutions are reluctant to hold shares of companies that have high control to 
cash flow rights ratios of principal shareholders. Falkenstein (1996) and Huang (2009) show that 
mutual funds prefer stocks with higher market liquidity.  
This bulging literature, however, to our best knowledge, does not include institutional 
investors’ preferences on another group of influential market participants—bank holding 
companies (BHCs). In this study, we fill this gap by examining which bank characteristics attract 
institutional investing. We find that when investing in BHCs, institutional investors still follow a 
“prudent investment” strategy as they prefer to invest in BHCs that hold more liquid assets, are 
better capitalized, are larger in size, have better loan quality, and have lower stock return volatility 
and lower activities in derivative trading.  
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We then analyze the changes of institutional investors’ preferences surrounding the passage 
of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB Act). The GLB Act is one of the most significant changes 
in banking regulation. It partially repeals the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibited commercial 
banks from engaging in investment banking and insurance business (Kroszner and Rajan (1994)). 
The massive expansion of banking power allows bank holding companies to bundle services and 
swap information across different divisions, which can reduce information production costs and 
enhance banking services to client firms (Kanatas and Qi (2003) and Yasuda (2005)). However, the 
potential for conflicts of interests also arises (Kroszner and Rajan (1997) and Song (2004)). For 
example, with the new granted securities underwriting power, it is possible for banks to assist firms 
that are in the brink of default to issue public securities and raise money to repay loans. Information 
obtained from lending and underwriting can also be channeled to the asset management divisions 
to gain trading advantages (see, for example, Acharya and Johnson (2007) and Massa and Rehman 
(2008)). Banks no longer only operate as lenders, many become financial conglomerates with 
complex business activities, which also make banks less transparent and difficult to monitor. 
Although the GLB Act has created sweeping changes in the financial services industry, 
systematic evaluation of its impacts on banks as a whole is scarce.1 In this paper, we fill the gap 
by investigating the effect from the perspective of institutional investors. The changes of their 
investment preferences and their abilities to predict bank performance can shed light on the effects 
of this important Act. Our sample of bank holding companies starts from 1986 Q3 as it’s the first 
quarter the FR Y9-C data is available on WRDS and our sample ends in 2013 Q4.  
                                                          
1 Most of studies in this area focus on one or two business lines, such as combine lending, 
underwriting, or asset management, and information spillover to different divisions. The analysis 
also tends to investigate the effects on borrowers and/or securities issuers. 
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We entertain two possible hypotheses. Allowing banks to explore new activities can 
increase banks’ revenue sources and the diversification across business lines can potentially 
smooth earnings and make the banks safer. Prudent institutional investors would prefer such 
changes and increase holdings, which we tested as the expansion hypothesis. However, the 
expansion of bank power can also make it harder to monitor and value banks due to the complexity 
of financial conglomerates. There are great concerns that banks may take advantage of deposit 
insurance and too big to fail by taking excessive risk. Following the financial crisis, market 
participants have questioned whether the expansion of bank power have led to weaker lending 
standards, increased risk-taking behavior, and contributed to losses faced by the financial sector.2   
This opaqueness and concerns for risk-taking can discourage institutional investing, which we 
label as the opaqueness hypothesis. 
Note that these two hypotheses are not necessarily mutually exclusive and can coexist 
because banks have multiple dimensions and can be very different. Each dimension can attract and 
discourage institutional investments, thus we analyze the effects not only through the changes of 
intercepts across time, but also through the changes of coefficients on various bank characteristics. 
To further examine the opaqueness of banks, we analyze institutional investors’ ability to predict 
bank performance through their trading. 
To implement our analysis, it is necessary to recognize that the repeal of the Glass-Steagall 
Act indeed occurred gradually over time. For example, the Federal Reserve Board allowed some 
commercial banks to engage in limited underwriting of debt securities in 1987 up to 5% of the 
revenues of their Section 20 subsidiaries. The subsidiaries are named “Section 20” because it is 
                                                          
2 See, for example, “The financial crisis: walls come down, reviving fears of a falling titan,” Wall 
Street Journal, September 23, 2008. 
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the ruling in the Glass-Steagall Act related to restrictions on non-bank activities. In 1989, 
underwriting powers were expanded to include both debt and equity and the revenue limitation 
was raised to 10% which was further revised to 25% in 1996 (Shivdasani and Song, 2011).3 
Basically, banks had to submit individual applications to acquire the power to engage in non-bank 
activities since 1987. Therefore, not all banks have started the expansion at the same time, but 
gradually throughout the 1990s. Therefore, we classify the banks into two groups—the early 
movers, who have engaged in non-banking activities by setting up Section 20 subsidiaries prior to 
the enactment of GLB, and the late adopters, who have become Financial Holding Companies 
(FHCs) and started to do business in non-banking areas after the enactment of GLB. For the easy 
of distinguishing these two types of banks, we call the early mover, Section 20 banks, and the rest 
of banks, FHC banks. The Section 20 banks are analyzed based on their individual application 
approval dates, while the FHC banks are analyzed based on the dates they are designated as 
Financial Holding Companies after the enactment of GLBA. 
Our results suggest the institutional investors welcome the expansion of bank power in 
general, and the positive effect is more profound for the early movers. In addition, following the 
expansion of banking power, institutional investors become less responsive to the BHCs’ risk 
characteristics. Again, the relaxation on the risk features is more significant for the early movers. 
Specifically, institutional investors are less concerned about liquidity, equity ratio, size and 
profitability when investing in Section 20 banks while they also loosen their requirement on size 
and loan quality for FHC banks. In addition, we find some evidence that the increased complexity 
                                                          
3 For the initial rulings, see J.P Morgan & Co. Inc., The Chase Manhattan Corp., Bankers Trust 
New York Corp., Citicorp, and Security Pacific Corp., Federal Reserve Bulletin 75 (1989): 192-




in BHCs after expansion of bank power makes it more difficult for institutions to implement 
informative trades in these BHCs. 
We further analyze investment preferences by different types of institutional investors. 
First we separate institutions into grey institutions and independent institutions following Chen, 
Harford, and Li (2007) based on whether the institutions have potential business relationship with 
the banks they invest. Secondly, we separate institutions into short-term institutions and long-term 
institutions following Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) based on the institutions’ investment 
horizons. Our results indicate all but long-term institutions have increased their holding in BHCs 
to some extent with the expansion of bank power. Grey institutions increase their investment in 
early movers as these BHCs set up Section 20 subsidiaries while independent and short-term 
institutions respond positively to both establishment of Section 20 subsidiaries and designation of 
FHCs. Though different institutions relax restrictions on different risk characteristics, they all 
become less risk-averse after the expansion of bank power.  
We further investigate whether the trading of different types of institutional investors can 
predict subsequent bank performance. When we look at the predictive power of institutional 
trading on BHCs’ future stock performance, we find that though the trading of short-term 
institutions is least informative relative to the trading of other institutions, the informativeness of 
tradings of all institutions is adversely affected by the expansion of bank power. When we look at 
operating performance, we find that informativeness of tradings is not adversely affected for grey 
and long-term institutions, but it is adversely affected for independent and short-term institutions.    
Overall, our analysis demonstrate that the first moves in expansion of bank power are 
welcomed among institutional investors. The opaqueness of banks do not seem to discourage much 
institutional investing. However, the preferences vary among different types of institutions. Grey 
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and long-term institutions appear to prefer banks that expand more conservatively. Their trades 
also have slightly stronger predictive power of subsequent bank performance than independent 
and short-term institutional investors. 
This paper contributes to the literature in institutional investors and more generally in the 
financial institution area. It sheds light on the effect of the GLB Act and provides implications of 
this important regulation change. Our evidence shows that this Act significantly affects the 
composition of institutional investors among U.S. banks. The remainder of this paper is organized 
as follows. Section 1.2 describes the data and variables. Section 1.3 reports the results on general 
relationship and 1.4 reports the results on the expansion of bank power. Section 1.5 concludes. 
1.2 Data, Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
In this section, we discuss sample construction, variable definitions and summary statistics for 
key variables.  
1.2.1 Data sources 
Our sample starts from 1986 Q3 as it’s the first quarter the FR Y9-C data is available on WRDS; 
and our sample ends in 2013 Q4. We get stock return information from CRSP daily stock file. We 
collect institutional holding data from Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13f) Database. 
Institutional investors that use United States mail in their business and exercise investment 
discretion over $100 million are required to file Form 13F with SEC pursuant to Section 13(f) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Form 13F filings provides information regarding the 
securities holdings of institutional investors. Exceptions are small positions that include fewer than 
10,000 shares of a given issuer and the aggregate fair market value of the same position is less than 
$200,000. The commonly used databases for institutional holdings are the Thomson Financial sets 
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that are also known as CDA/Spectrum 13f database. The Thomson sets are available on WRDS as 
part of the Thomson Financial Network (TFN).  
One issue with TFN 13f data is there are serious classification errors in recent years. Many 
banks (TYPECODE=1) and Independent Investment Advisors (TYPECODE=4) are misclassified 
as others (TYPECODE=5) in 1998 and beyond4. Previous studies usually correct this problem by 
replacing a manager’s TYPECODE after 1998 with the TYPECODE reported before 19985. After 
further investigating the data, we find that misclassification can happen to institutions whose post-
1998 TYPECODE is not 5 as well. For example, Brown Brothers Harriman & CO had a 
TYPECODE of “5” up to June 30, 1998 after which its TYPECODE was recorded as “1”; or Epoch 
Investment Partners, Inc. whose TYPECODE changed from “5” before September 30, 2008 to “4” 
afterwards. To fully address this issue, we replace an institution’s later date TYPECODE with its 
earliest date TYPECODE. Because the MGRNO identifiers are reused in TFN 13(f), we assign a 
new unique identifier to each include institution based on its MGRNAME, MGRNO, and RDATE 
in TFN. Whenever in doubt, we double check the institution’s information on EDGAR and the 
institution’s website (if a website is available). Then we further confine our sample to institutions 
that have ever invested in BHCs. We merge BHCs and their institutional investors using CUSIP.  
1.2.2 Institutional ownership and types 
Thomson Financial Spectrum classifies institutions into five types: 1) banks; 2) insurance 
companies; 3) investment companies and their managers; 4) independent investment advisers; and 
5) others (pension funds, endowments, etc.). Following Chen, Harford, and Li (2007), we classify 
types 3 and 4 as well as public pension funds6 from type 5 as independent institutions; and types 
                                                          
4 “WRDS Overview of Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund and Investment Company Data”. 
5 For example, Ivashina and Sun (2011). 
6 A list of public pension funds is provided in the appendix. 
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1 and 2 as grey institutions7. Total institutional ownership (IO_Total) is calculated as the ratio of 
a BHC’s total shares held by 13f investors over the BHC’s total shares outstanding. Total 
institutional ownership from grey institutions (IO_Grey) is computed as the percentage of shares 
held by grey institutions; total institutional ownership from independent institutions (IO_Indp) is 
computed as the percentage of shares held by independent institutions.  
We also classify institutional investors into short-term and long-term investors based on 
their trading behaviors: short-term institutions should trade more frequently than long-term 
institutions. Following Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) and Cella, Ellul and Mariassunta (2013), 
we estimate an institution’s churn ratio holding an investment portfolio of firms denoted as I by 
the following equation, 
𝐶𝑅𝐺𝑀𝑀,𝑘,𝑡 =




                     (1.1)      
where 𝑁𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 are the number of shares and price of stock i held by institution k in quarter t. 
The value of the churn ratio ranges from 0 to 2. The higher the value, the more frequently an 
institution buy and sell shares. 
After obtaining churn ratio for institution k in quarter t, we calculate each institution’s 







                                                               (1.2) 
Each quarter, we sort all institutions into three tertile portfolios based on average churn 
rates. The institutions that rank in the top tertile (with highest 𝐴𝑉𝐺_𝐶𝑅𝑘,𝑡) are classified as short-
                                                          
7 In Chen, Harford, and Li (2007), they classify banks, insurance companies and all non-public 
pension funds from type 5 as grey institutions; for our purpose, we include only banks and 
insurance companies as grey institutions. 
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term institutional investors and institutions that rank in the bottom tertile are classified as long-
term institutions. Long-term institutional ownership (short-term institutional ownership) is the 
holding of all long-term institutions (all short-term institutions) over the firm’s number of shares 
outstanding.  
1.2.3 BHC characteristics and stock performance 
We obtain consolidated financial information of bank holding companies (BHCs) from the FR Y-
9C reports from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (FRB Chicago). Following Peria and 
Schumkler (2001), and Hadad, Agusman, Monroe, Gasbarro and Zumwalt (2011), we construct 
measures for various BHC characteristics:  
(1) Liquidity risk. We measure a BHC’s balance sheet liquidity by the ratio of liquid assets 
over total assets (LIQ). 
(2) Credit risk or loan quality. We compute the sum of loans past due 90 days or more and 
loans not accruing for bad loans, scaled by total assets (LQLT). 
(3) Capital adequacy. We use total equity capital over total assets (EQT). 
(4) Profitability. We use return on assets (PRF).  
(5) Efficiency. We use the ratio of noninterest expenditures to total assets (EFF). 
Following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), we also collect the following measures for our 
sample BHCs: 
(6) Reliance on off-balance-sheet activity. We use the ratio of noninterest income over total 
net income. 
(7) Time-varying risk preferences. We use BHC’s derivative trading over assets (DT) and 
BHC’s derivate hedging over assets (DH).   
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We also include the logarithm of BHC assets (Size) as total assets has been shown to be a 
proxy for bank diversification potential (Brewer, 1989). Larger banks may also be redeemed safer 
by investors due to “too big to fail”. All BHC characteristic measures but Size are in percentage. 
In addition, we also include two BHC stock performance measure. QRET is for compounded stock 
return over the quarter using BHCs’ daily return data; QVOL is quarterly return volatility, 
calculated as the variance of daily returns over the quarter.  
1.2.4 Descriptive statistics for BHC characteristics 
We provide summary statistics for major BHC characteristic measures in Table 1.1. In Panel A of 
Table 1.1, we present the descriptive statistics for all sample BHCs. We provide mean, median, 
standard deviation, 25th percentile and 75th percentile for each variable. Along with each variable, 
we also provide the number of BHC-quarters that has available information to compute the 
statistic. The mean and median for BHC size are fairly close, indicating that our size measure is 
fairly symmetric after taking the logarithm of the book value of asset. An average BHC holds 
around 25% liquid assets, enjoys 0.5% return on assets, and holds around 8.8% of assets in equity 
capital. 
On average, BHCs spend 2% of assets on noninterest expense. Nonperforming loans, 
estimated by the sum of loans over 90 days late and loans not accruing, take up around 0.77% for 
an average BHC. The distribution of derivatives used for trading and hedging are highly skewed 
indicating that not every BHC is equally active in using derivatives. Average quarterly return for 
sample BHCs is 3.3% with a mean standard deviation of 0.09. 
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Table 1.1 Summary Statistics 
Panel A. Summary Statistics for the whole sample  
Variable   Mean   Median   Std Dev   P25   P75   N 
BHC Risk Characteristics          
Size  14.424  14.081  1.601  13.264  15.280  40541 
LIQ  24.833  23.599  11.380  16.744  31.290  40541 
PRF  0.512  0.521  0.695  0.265  0.849  40541 
EQT  8.857  8.517  2.640  7.196  10.062  40541 
EFF  2.069  1.894  1.229  1.112  2.726  40541 
LQLT 0.774  0.350  1.250  0.100  0.876  40541 
DT  13.441  0.000  139.279  0.000  0.000  40541 
DH  2.057  0.000  7.583  0.000  0.279  40541 
NONINC 15.813  13.281  11.041  8.861  19.564  40541 
QRET  3.314  2.527  17.003  -5.331  11.630  40494 
QVOL  0.089  0.041  0.184  0.022  0.083  40490 
Institutional ownership          
IO_Total  24.259  17.901  21.387  6.664  37.152  40541 
IO_Indp  13.661  9.531  13.472  2.739  20.922  40541 
IO_Grey  7.974  4.883  8.722  1.302  12.893  40541 
IO_ST  3.054  1.385  4.527  0.083  4.253  40541 
IO_LT  11.462  8.093  11.076  2.563  17.665  40541 
Panel B. Univariate comparison between Non-Section 20 and Section 20 BHCs  




test Variable Mean Median N   Mean Median N   
BHC Risk Characteristics          
Size 14.149 13.886 17747  17.954 18.022 708  121.807 *** 43.376 *** 
LIQ 27.720 26.337 17747  23.913 22.325 708  -8.519 *** -11.051 *** 
PRF 0.565 0.561 17747  0.640 0.629 708  4.161 *** 3.954 *** 
EQT 8.414 8.090 17747  7.021 7.161 708  -25.587 *** -16.534 *** 
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(Table 1.1 continued)      




test Variable Mean Median N   Mean Median N   
EFF 2.159 1.992 17747  2.181 2.059 708  0.503  1.003  
LQLT 0.420 0.170 17747  0.446 0.222 708  0.850  1.242  
DT 1.792 0.000 17747  144.276 0.033 708  12.754 *** 52.162 *** 
DH 0.181 0.000 17747  2.579 0.000 708  12.414 *** 41.692 *** 
NONINC 12.954 11.389 17747  23.111 22.172 708  32.439 *** 32.054 *** 
QRET 4.390 3.221 17712  5.477 5.953 708  1.926 * 3.284 *** 
QVOL 0.085 0.043 17710  0.036 0.026 708  -27.584 *** -14.338 *** 
Institutional ownership            
IO_Total 18.656 13.809 17747  50.124 51.852 708  59.418 *** 36.597 *** 
IO_Indp 10.085 6.496 17747  28.842 29.198 708  42.299 *** 34.406 *** 
IO_Grey 8.068 4.455 17747  20.057 19.954 708  50.768 *** 33.383 *** 
IO_ST 3.027 1.254 17747  6.805 6.034 708  22.960 *** 26.987 *** 
IO_LT 8.480 5.493 17747  22.886 22.383 708  52.885 *** 35.746 *** 
Panel C. Univariate comparison between FHCs and Non-FHCs after GLBA  




test  Variable Mean Median N  Mean Median N  
BHC Risk Characteristics             
Size 14.082 13.861 14979  15.041 14.715 6222  43.058 *** 42.727 *** 
LIQ 22.439 21.164 14979  22.989 20.698 6222  3.219 *** 2.052 ** 
PRF 0.417 0.455 14979  0.557 0.533 6222  13.057 *** 11.431 *** 
EQT 9.122 8.815 14979  9.644 9.228 6222  12.395 *** 12.649 *** 
EFF 1.962 1.784 14979  2.029 1.831 6222  3.428 *** 2.200 ** 
LQLT 1.121 0.545 14979  0.940 0.527 6222  -8.943 *** 0.157  
DT 0.926 0.000 14979  25.551 0.000 6222  8.662 *** 25.644 *** 
DH 2.134 0.000 14979  4.562 0.513 6222  16.585 *** 33.294 *** 
NONINC 15.133 13.362 14979  21.815 18.901 6222  33.229 *** 37.758 *** 
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(Table 1.1 continued)      




test  Variable Mean Median N  Mean Median N  
QRET 2.221 1.698 14967  2.803 2.327 6222  2.267 ** 3.074 *** 
QVOL 0.103 0.042 14965  0.077 0.035 6222  -10.338 *** -11.153 *** 
Institutional ownership            
IO_Total 23.654 16.875 14979  34.336 29.360 6222  29.905 *** 30.392 *** 
IO_Indp 13.867 9.525 14979  19.406 15.751 6222  24.545 *** 25.936 *** 
IO_Grey 5.995 3.396 14979  9.559 8.267 6222  31.726 *** 37.964 *** 
IO_ST 2.657 0.969 14979  3.461 2.002 6222  12.466 *** 21.585 *** 
IO_LT 11.367 8.194 14979   16.607 14.835 6222   29.424 *** 31.267 *** 
Notes: Panel A presents descriptive statistics for BHC characteristics and institutional ownership. Panel B provides a 
univariate comparison of BHC characteristics and institutional ownership between non-Section 20 BHCs and Section 20 
BHCs before the enactment of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA). Panel C provides a univariate comparison of BHC 
characteristics and institutional ownership for BHCs that are designated as Financial Holding Companies after the 
enactment of GLBA. SIZE is natural logarithm of total assets. LIQ measures a BHC’s balance sheet liquidity, it’s 
calculated as liquid assets over total assets. PRF is profitability measures, it’s calculated as net income over total assets. 
EQT is equity ratio, calculated as equity capital over total assets. EFF is BHC efficiency measure, it’s calculated as 
noninterest expenses over total assets. LQLT is BHC loan quality measures, it’s calculated as the sum of nonperforming 
and nonaccrual loans over total assets. DT is total gross notional amount of derivative contracts held for trading over total 
assets. DH is total value of derivatives used for hedging purposes over total assets. NONINC is noninterest income over 
the sum of interest- and noninterest income. QRET compounded quarterly return using daily data. QVOL is quarterly 
return volatility, calculated as the variance of daily returns over the quarter. LIQ, PRF, LQLT, EQT, EFF, DT, and DH, 
and NONINC are in percentages. IO_Total is a BHC’s total institutional ownership from all 13f institutions. IO_Indp is a 
BHC’s total institutional ownership from independent institutions; and IO_Grey is a BHC’s total institutional ownership 
from grey institutions. IO_ST is a BHC’s total institutional ownership from short-term institutions. IO_LT is a BHC’s 





On average, institutional investors hold 24.3% of sample BHCs’ shares. On average, more 
than 10% of BHCs’ shares are held by independent institutions; while around 8% of shares are held 
by grey institutions. When we separate institutions into short-term and long-term institutions (note 
that we do not include the institutions whose churn rates fall in the middle tertile by this 
classification), we see that for an average BHC, its long-term institutional ownership is much higher 
than short-term institutional ownership. 
In Panel B of Table 1.1, we seek to understand the differences in characteristics between 
BHCs with Section 20 subsidiaries and those without before the enactment of GLBA. We use t-test 
and Wilcoxon test to investigate difference in means on various BHC characteristics and institutional 
ownership measures between the two groups. We can see that Section 20 BHCs are larger in size, 
hold slightly less liquid assets, are more profitable, have relatively lower equity ratio, are more active 
in derivative trading and hedging, rely more heavily on non-interest income, and have higher stock 
returns and lower return volatility. In terms of institutional holdings, Section 20 BHCs have much 
higher proportion of their shares held by institutions; it applies to all types of institutions as well as 
all institutions as a whole. 
The centerpiece created by the GLBA is the Financial Holding Companies (FHCs). BHCs 
and foreign banks that meet certain criteria can become a FHC. In Panel C of Table 1.1, we 
investigate whether BHC characteristics and institutional ownership differ between BHCs that are 
Financial Holding Companies and those that are not. The univariate tests suggest that FHCs are 
larger in size, hold more liquid assets, enjoy higher profitability, are better capitalized, spend more 
on non-interest expenses, and have better loan quality. Financial Holding Companies are also more 
active in using derivatives for trading and hedging purposes, and they generate a higher proportion 
of their income from non-interest incomes, and they have higher stock returns but lower return 
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volatility. When we compare the institutional ownership between FHCs and non-FHCs, we also 
observe that FHCs have higher aggregate institutional ownership than do non-FHCs and the same 
holds for all different types of institutional investors.  
1.3 General Relationship   
1.3.1 Total institutional ownership and BHC risk characteristics for the whole sample 
We start our regression analysis by investigating whether institutional investors prefer certain BHC 
characteristics. To do so, we regress aggregate institutional ownership on various BHC 
characteristics, 
𝐼𝑂_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                              (1.3) 
In the above equation, 𝐼𝑂_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 denotes the total institutional ownership for BHC i in quarter t. 
𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of BHC characteristics that may affect its institutional ownership. We also 
include BHC fixed effects (𝜶𝒊) to control for unobserved heterogeneity across BHCs and time 
fixed effects (𝜶𝒕) to control for unobserved heterogeneity across different time periods. We cluster 
standard errors at BHC level to allow for intragroup correlation. The regression results are reported 
in Table 1.2.  
 
Table 1.2 Institutional ownership and BHC risk characteristics 
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
VARIABLES Panel  Orthogonal  2SLS 
            
LIQt−1 0.076***  0.079***  1.789*** 
 (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.371) 
EQTt−1 1.307***  1.341***  4.014** 
 (0.105)  (0.108)  (2.045) 
SIZEt−1 7.106***  6.836***  54.513*** 
 (0.902)  (0.921)  (11.951) 
PRFt−1 0.296  0.721**  -15.277** 
 (0.226)  (0.312)  (6.853) 
LQLTt−1 -0.400**  -0.351*  0.850 
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(Table 1.2 continued)     
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
VARIABLES Panel  Orthogonal  2SLS 
 (0.194)  (0.205)  (2.221) 
QRETt−1 0.007**  -0.004  0.421* 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.252) 
QVOLt−1 -3.414***  -3.555***  -27.846*** 
 (0.676)  (0.776)  (10.470) 
EFFt−1 0.218  0.481  5.117** 
 (0.203)  (0.295)  (2.101) 
DTt−1 -0.011***  -0.011***  -0.598*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.121) 
DHt−1 -0.054  -0.057  -1.066 
 (0.046)  (0.046)  (1.428) 
NONINCt−1 -0.020  -0.040  -2.274*** 
 (0.041)  (0.042)  (0.586) 
Constant -98.203***  17.317***  -797.979*** 
 (12.485)  (1.558)  (163.232) 
      
Observations 39,480  28,886  28,886 
# BHCs 1,004  994  994 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.592  0.586  0.121 
Time Fixed Yes  Yes  No 
BHC Fixed Yes  Yes  Yes 
F-test bank risk 
measures 29.78  30.46   
Sargan-Hansen Stat     2.225 
P-Value         0.136 
Notes: This table provides panel regression results of total institutional ownership on various BHC 
risk measures. More specifically, we estimate: 𝐼𝑂_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
Total institutional ownership (IO_TOTAL) is calculated as number of shares held by institutions 
divided by a BHC’s total shares outstanding. All dependent variables are defined as in Table 1.1 and 
are in percentages. LIQ, PRF, LQLT, EQT, EFF, DT, and DH, and NONINC are in percentages. In 
all regressions, the independent variables are lagged by one period. In Column 1 we use the level of 
risk measures. In Column 2 we orthogonalize each risk measure to change in institutional ownership 
and use the orthogonalized risk measure errors in the regression. In Column 3, we use instrumental 
regression, the instruments chosen for the risk measures are industry average of each risk measure 
and individual BHCs’ deposit-loan difference at time t-2. We include time-fixed and BHC-fixed 
effects to control for non-observable heterogeneities among BHCs and different quarters. We cluster 
standard error at BHC level to allow for intragroup correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Column 1 shows that institutional ownership is positively correlated BHCs’ balance sheet 
liquidity, capital equity ratio and size and stock returns. At the same time, institutional investors 
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appear avoid BHCs with worse loan quality, higher stock return volatility and active derivative 
trading. And the F-test shows that BHC risk measures are jointly significant in explaining 
institutional ownership level. The results are consistent with the argument that institutional 
investors’ fiduciary responsibilities give them a strong incentive to choose stocks that are deemed 
as “prudent investment”. 
1.3.2 Endogeneity concern  
Although we postulate that institutional investors prefer low-risk BHCs, the negative relation 
between institutional ownership and BHC risk measures may be driven by reserve causality (i.e., 
institutional investor activism causes BHCs to confine their risk-taking activities). We have used 
lagged BHC risk measures in the regression, which makes it less likely for the causality to run from 
institutional ownership to bank risk. However, to further address this issue, we first orthogonalize 
each BHC risk measure by contemporaneous institutional holding changes and use the regression 
residuals to replace corresponding BHC risk measures.  
The result is reported in Column 2 of Table 1.2. The result is quantitatively similar to that in 
Column 1; the only exception is that BHC profitability is now positive and significant. Secondly, 
we employ instrumental variable regressions. Admittedly, it is challenging to find valid instrumental 
variables that predict a BHC’s risk characteristic but not its institutional ownership.  Nevertheless, 
we use the industry average of each risk measure and individual BHCs’ deposit-loan difference at 
time t-2 as the instruments for included risk measures; we then replace each risk measure with its 
predicted value. The second-stage regression result is provided in Column 3 of Table 1.2. Liquidity, 
equity ratio, size, stock return, return volatility and derivative trading have maintained their signs 
and significance, though loan quality has lost its significance. In addition, the overidentification tests 
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cannot reject the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid instruments, i.e., 
uncorrelated with the error term but is correlated with securitization measures.   
1.3.3 Total institutional trading and future BHC performance for the whole sample 
In Section 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 we have demonstrated that institutional investors prefer “safer” bank 
holding companies. In this section, we focus on whether institutional trading can predict BHCs’ 
future performance such as stock performance and operating performance. We examine 6 different 
performance measures: subsequent quarter abnormal stock returns, one-year buy-and-holding 
returns, two-year buy-and-hold returns, stock tail risk, and return on asset and loan loss provision. 
We regress one of the performance measures on institutional trading with BHC fixed effect and 
date fixed effect. The regressions are of the form 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝛥𝐼𝑂_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡         (1.4) 
In the above equation 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 represents one of the performance measures: 𝐶𝐴𝑅2𝑖,𝑡+1 for 
abnormal stock returns for the subsequent quarter using Carhart four factor model, 
𝑅𝐸𝑇1𝑦𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝐸𝑇2𝑦𝑟 are buy-and-hold return over the next one year and the next two years, 
respectively, 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡+1  is the negative of the average return on the BHC’s stock during the 
5% worst returns days in subsequent quarter, and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 for BHC i’s return on assets in the 
subsequent quarter, 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑡+1 is loan loss provision over total assets.  𝛥𝐼𝑂_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 represents the 
change in total institutional ownership. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of control variables. Regression results are 
provided in Table 1.3.  
The regression results provide strong evidence that institutional trading can predict future 
BHC performance: institutional trading is positively and significantly related to one-year buy-and-
hold returns and future ROA; and it is negatively and significantly related to tail risk and loan loss 
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provision. The evidence indicates that institutional investors as a whole have information about the 
BHCs they invest and they are able to pick the ones that will outperform in the future.  
 
Table 1.3 Institutional trading and future BHC performance. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 𝑅𝐸𝑇1𝑦𝑟 𝑅𝐸𝑇2𝑦𝑟 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑡 
       
𝛥𝐼𝑂_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑡−1 0.004 0.001** 0.001 -0.022*** 0.005*** -0.002*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Observations 38,480 34,307 32,406 38,480 38,527 38,527 
# BHCs 999 1,000 976 999 999 999 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.015 0.377 0.402 0.438 0.302 0.348 
Date Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: This table reports panel regression results of BHC performance on institutional trading. 
CHGIO_TOTAL is the change in total institutional ownership from previous quarter for each BHC. 
The regressions are of the following form, 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝛥𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
CAR is quarterly cumulative abnormal returns from Fama-French three factor model.  Tail risk 
measures the size of losses in the extreme left tail of the BHC’s return distribution. 
𝑅𝐸𝑇1𝑦𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝐸𝑇2𝑦𝑟 are buy-and-hold return over the next one year and the next two years, 
respectively. Following Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon and Richardson (2010), tail risk is calculated 
as the negative of the average return on the BHC’s stock during the 5% worst returns days for the 
BHC’s stock over the quarter. Hence, higher value indicates higher tail risk. We use ROA to measure 
BHC profitability. LLP is loan loss provision over total assets. We include time-fixed and BHC-
fixed effects to control for non-observable heterogeneities among BHCs and different quarters. We 
cluster standard error at BHC level to allow for intragroup correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
1.4 The Impact of Section 20 Subsidiary and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
1.4.1 Total institutional ownership and BHC risk characteristics with the establishment of Section 
20 subsidiary and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
After the baseline analysis for the whole sample, we now turn our attention to the establishment of 
Section 20 subsidiary and the enactment of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (enacted on November 12, 
1999). In 1987, the Federal Reserve permitted banks to establish special Section 20 investment 
banking subsidiaries engaged in certain “ineligible” securities activities. Not all banks can establish 
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Section 20 affiliates, and special permission must be received from the Federal Reserve. Despite 
banks’ attempts to circumvent legal restrictions, a separation among commercial banking, 
investment banking, and insurance effectively remained in existence until 1999 when President 
Clinton signed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act into law. Ever since, BHCs and foreign banks that meet 
certain criteria can become a FHC and engage in a wider range activities, such as securities 
underwriting and dealing, insurance agency and underwriting activities, and merchant banking 
activities. We seek to understand how the expansion of bank power affects institutional investing 
and whether the impact is the same for the early adopters (i.e. Section 20 banks) and late adopters 
(i.e. BHCs that are designated as FHCs after the enactment of GLBA). We construct two dummy 
variables to account for different events: Sec20 is a dummy variable that equals one for BHC-
quarters when a BHC has established Section 20 subsidiary and zero otherwise; FHC is a dummy 
variable that equals one for non-Section 20 BHCs that are designated as Financial Holding 
Companies after the enactment of GLBA and zero otherwise. To examine the impact of Section 20 
subsidiary and the enactment of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act on institutional investment, we regress 
institutional ownership on BHC risk measures as well as their interaction terms with the two dummy 
variables.  
Results are provided in Table 1.4. Column 1 reports the regression coefficients on risk 
measures; Column 2 reports the regression coefficients on risk measures’ interaction terms with 
Sec20; Column 3 reports the regression coefficients on risk measures’ interaction terms with FHC.  
In Column 4, we provide F-test on equality of coefficients on risk measures’ interaction terms with 
Sec20 and FHC. This specification allows us to examine the different impacts Section 20 
Subsidiaries and GLB have on BHCs’ institutional ownership. The coefficients of Sec20 and FHC 
as well as the F-test indicate that institutional investors respond actively to expansion of bank power 
21 
 
in general; and such direct positive impact of expansion of bank power is stronger for the Sec20 
banks than for FHCs. After examining the coefficients of interaction terms, we also find that 
institutional investors are willing to take more risk when investing BHCs with expanded power. For 
example, institutional investors are willing to invest in Section 20 banks with lower liquidity, lower 
equity ratio, smaller size, lower profitability but higher stock return volatilities; or they are willing 
to invest in FHCs with smaller size and lower loan quality (they do oppose excessive activities in 
derivative trading). In addition, the F-tests for the equality of coefficients on interaction terms 
suggest that the change in institutional investors’ willingness to tolerate BHCs’ risk is more 
pronounced for the early adopters.  
  
Table 1.4 Institutional ownership and BHC risk characteristics with the establishment of Section 
20 subsidiary and enactment of GLBA 






F-test for BHC 
Char*Sec20= 
BHC Char*FHC 
       
LIQt−1 0.092*** -0.133* 0.005 2.096 
 (0.029) (0.078) (0.063)  
EQTt−1 1.369*** -0.811* -0.184 1.737 
 (0.118) (0.444) (0.231)  
SIZEt−1 7.455*** -5.207** -1.041* 3.883** 
 (0.873) (2.051) (0.567)  
PRFt−1 0.318 -2.237*** -0.302 5.845*** 
 (0.215) (0.681) (0.497)  
LQLTt−1 -0.589*** 0.326 1.670*** 2.871* 
 (0.179) (0.658) (0.487)  
QRETt−1 0.003 0.015 0.008 0.373 
 (0.003) (0.011) (0.007)  
QVOLt−1 -2.837*** 7.245*** 0.329 7.737*** 
 (0.657) (2.114) (1.559)  
EFFt−1 0.129 0.394 0.110 0.661 
 (0.197) (0.313) (0.182)  
DTt−1 -0.002 -0.003 -0.009*** 4.337** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)  
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(Table 1.4 continued)   






F-test for BHC 
Char*Sec20= 
BHC Char*FHC 
     
DHt−1 0.031 -0.156** 0.026 6.497** 
 (0.053) (0.070) (0.072)  
NONINCt−1 0.013 -0.039 -0.011 0.0928 
 (0.038) (0.074) (0.061)  
     
Constant -104.374***    
 (12.175)    
Sec20  96.684***   
  (35.216)   
FHC   17.226*  
   (8.809)  
Sec20=FHC    4.894** 
     
Observations 39,480    
Number of BHCs 1,004    
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.607    
Time Fixed Yes    
BHC Fixed Yes    
Notes: This table reports the regression of total institutional ownership on BHC risk characteristics 
and their interactions with Sec20 as well as GLB, 
        𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽0 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐20 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝐻𝐶 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
𝛾1 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐20 + 𝛾2 ∗ 𝐹𝐻𝐶 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Independent variable is aggregate institutional ownership from all 13f institutions. Sec20 is a dummy 
variable that equals one for BHC-quarters when a BHC has established Section 20 subsidiary and 
zero otherwise. FHC is a dummy variable that equals one for non-Section 20 BHCs that are 
designated as Financial Holding Companies after the enactment of GLBA and zero otherwise. Other 
variables are defined as in Table 1.1. Column 1 reports the regression coefficients on risk measures; 
Column 2 reports the regression coefficients on risk measures’ interaction terms with Sec20 and 
Column 3 reports the regression coefficients on risk measures’ interaction terms with FHC. In 
Column 4, we provide F-test on equality of coefficients on risk measures’ interaction terms with 
Sec20 and FHC. We include time-fixed and BHC-fixed effects to control for non-observable 
heterogeneities among BHCs and different quarters. We cluster standard error at BHC level to allow 





1.4.2 Total institutional trading and future BHC performance with the establishment of Section 20 
subsidiary and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
In this section, we would like to know whether the predictive power of institutional trading on 
future BHC performance is affected by Section 20 subsidiary or GLB. We augment the regressions 
in Table 1.3 with Section 20 dummy, FHC dummy as well as their interactions with institutional 
trading. The results are reported in Table 1.5. 
The results in Table 1.5 suggest that institutional trading can predict one-year buy-and-hold 
returns, tails risk, return on assets (ROA) and loan loss provision (LLP) for BHCs without 
expanded banks power. As the first group of BHCs make attempt to expand into non-banking 
business, the increased complexity makes it more difficult for institutional investors to direct 
information-driven trades. Specifically, the institutional trading is positively related to BHCs’ tail 
risk and loan loss provision for Section 20 banks. In addition, expansion of bank power appears to 
increase both Section 20 and FHC banks’ profitability. Also FHCs seem to have lower loan loss 
provision.  
 
Table 1.5 Institutional trading and future BHC performance with the establishment of Section 20 
subsidiary and enactment of GLB 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡+1 𝑅𝐸𝑇1𝑦𝑟 𝑅𝐸𝑇2𝑦𝑟 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡+1 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑡+1 
              
𝛥𝐼𝑂_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑡 0.003 0.112*** 0.087 -0.024*** 0.005*** -0.003*** 
 (0.004) (0.043) (0.067) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝛥𝐼𝑂_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑡 0.006 -0.046 0.016 0.040* -0.005 0.006* 
∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐20 (0.009) (0.128) (0.158) (0.021) (0.004) (0.003) 
𝛥𝐼𝑂_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑡 0.005 -0.161 -0.079 0.006 0.001 0.001 
∗ 𝐹𝐻𝐶 (0.008) (0.163) (0.200) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) 
Sec20 0.035 -8.470** -16.744** 0.573 0.142** -0.066 
 (0.148) (3.472) (6.886) (0.364) (0.066) (0.051) 
FHC -0.089 -2.588 -3.893 -0.150 0.109*** -0.071*** 
 (0.068) (1.940) (3.702) (0.130) (0.031) (0.021) 
Constant 0.757*** -4.360** 34.934*** 4.229*** 0.234*** 0.044*** 
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(Table 1.5 continued)     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡+1 𝑅𝐸𝑇1𝑦𝑟 𝑅𝐸𝑇2𝑦𝑟 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡+1 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑡+1 
       
 (0.208) (1.907) (4.074) (0.152) (0.022) (0.016) 
       
Observations 38,480 34,307 32,406 38,480 38,527 38,527 
# BHCs 999 1,000 976 999 999 999 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.015 0.404 0.427 0.439 0.303 0.349 
Date Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: this table provides the regression results of future BHC performance on aggregate 
institutional trading, its interaction with Sec20, its interaction with GLB, its interaction with Sec20, 
and FHC. Sec20 is a dummy variable that equals one for BHC-quarters when a BHC has established 
Section 20 subsidiary and zero otherwise FHC is a dummy variable that equals one for non-Section 
20 BHCs that are designated as Financial Holding Companies after the enactment of GLBA and zero 
otherwise. CAR is quarterly cumulative abnormal returns from Fama-French three factor model. 
Tail risk measures the size of losses in the extreme left tail of the BHC’s return distribution. 
𝑅𝐸𝑇1𝑦𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝐸𝑇2𝑦𝑟 are buy-and-hold return over the next one year and the next two years, 
respectively. Following Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon and Richardson (2010), tail risk is calculated 
as the negative of the average return on the BHC’s stock during the 5% worst returns days for the 
BHC’s stock over the quarter. Hence, higher value indicates higher tail risk. We use ROA to measure 
BHC profitability. LLP is loan loss provision over total assets. Other variables are defined as in 
Table 2. We include time-fixed and BHC-fixed effects to control for non-observable heterogeneities 
among BHCs and different quarters.  We cluster standard error at BHC level to allow for intragroup 
correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
1.4.3 Institutional ownership and BHC risk characteristics with the establishment of Section 20 
subsidiary and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act for different types of institutions 
In this section, we separate institutions into sub-groups using two different classifications. First, 
we separate institutions into independent and grey institutions based on whether they potentially 
have business ties with the BHCs they invest. Brickely, Lease, and Smith (1988) argue that some 
institutional investors (e.g., banks and insurance companies) might have existing or potential 
business relationships with the companies they invest. Here we follow Chen, Harford, and Li 
(2007) to classify banks and insurance companies as grey institutions, and investment companies, 
25 
 
independent investment advisors as well as public pension funds as independent institutions8. 
Second, we separate institutions into short-term and long-term institutions based on their trading 
behaviors. A short-term institutional investor would buy and sell its investments more frequently, 
while a long-term institutional investor would hold its positions unchanged for a considerable 
length of time. We follow Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) and Cella, Ellul and Mariassunta 
(2013) and calculate for each institutional investor a measure of how frequently its position on all 
the stocks in its portfolio is turned over (churn rate) then we rank each institution based on the 
average of its churn rates in the past four quarters. Institutions whose average churn rates fall in the 
top tercile are denoted as short-term institutions and institutions whose average churn rates fall in 
the bottom tercile are denoted as long-term institutions. We run the following regressions for 
different groups of institutions and report results in Table 1.6. 
𝐼𝑂_𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽0 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐20 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝐻𝐶 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
𝛾1 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐20 + 𝛾2 ∗ 𝐹𝐻𝐶 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                         (1.5) 
where 𝐼𝑂_𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 represents one of the following four institutional ownership measures: IO_Indp, 
IO_Grey, IO_ST and IO_LT. We provide the results for IO_Indp in Panel A, results for IO_Grey in 
Panel B, results for IO_ST in Panel C and results for IO_LT in Panel D. Sec20 is a dummy variable 
that equals one for BHC-quarters when a BHC has established Section 20 subsidiary and zero 
otherwise. FHC is a dummy variable that equals one for non-Section 20 BHCs that are designated 
as Financial Holding Companies after the enactment of GLBA and zero otherwise. 
 
 
                                                          
8 Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) also include institutions with a typecode of 5 (other than public 
pension funds) in 13f as grey institutions; we only include banks and insurance companies here. 
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Table 1.6 Institutional ownership and BHC risk characteristics with the establishment of Section 
20 subsidiary and GLB for different types of institutions. 
Panel A. Independent institutions 












       
LIQt−1 0.050** -0.068 -0.019 0.388 
 (0.020) (0.069) (0.043)  
EQTt−1 0.904*** -0.332 -0.156 0.123 
 (0.085) (0.484) (0.173)  
SIZEt−1 4.020*** -3.181* -1.090*** 1.408 
 (0.688) (1.728) (0.408)  
PRFt−1 0.100 -2.282*** -0.120 6.589** 
 (0.164) (0.760) (0.415)  
LQLTt−1 -0.345** 0.056 1.153*** 2.346 
 (0.137) (0.624) (0.390)  
QRETt−1 0.003 0.020* 0.007 1.117 
 (0.002) (0.012) (0.006)  
QVOLt−1 -1.973*** 4.442*** -2.151 10.32*** 
 (0.452) (1.550) (1.517)  
EFFt−1 0.006 0.616** 0.019 3.442* 
 (0.147) (0.296) (0.144)  
DTt−1 -0.000 -0.004 -0.008*** 2.084 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)  
DHt−1 0.005 -0.084 0.023 4.439** 
 (0.040) (0.055) (0.050)  
NONINCt−1 0.007 -0.015 0.018 0.153 
 (0.028) (0.074) (0.042)  
Constant -59.274***    
 (9.533)    
Sec20  56.215*   
  (29.256)   
FHC   17.400***  
   (6.166)  
Sec20=FHC    1.717 
     
Observations 39,480    
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.502    
Number of BHCs 1,004    
Time Fixed Yes    
BHC Fixed Yes       
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(Table 1.6 continued) 
Panel B. Grey institutions 












       
LIQt−1 0.014 -0.067 0.006 1.835 
 (0.013) (0.047) (0.029)  
EQTt−1 0.174*** -0.646*** 0.005 7.129*** 
 (0.043) (0.232) (0.095)  
SIZEt−1 2.839*** -2.193*** -0.250 6.304** 
 (0.337) (0.748) (0.223)  
PRFt−1 0.333*** -0.119 0.177 0.284 
 (0.090) (0.530) (0.196)  
LQLTt−1 -0.143** -0.878*** -0.231 4.088** 
 (0.068) (0.287) (0.159)  
QRETt−1 -0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.679 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.003)  
QVOLt−1 -0.378 0.022 2.609*** 5.366** 
 (0.253) (0.890) (0.793)  
EFFt−1 0.176** 0.015 0.015 0.000 
 (0.089) (0.130) (0.090)  
DTt−1 -0.002 0.002 -0.002* 7.135*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
DHt−1 0.009 -0.054** 0.006 6.163** 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.029)  
NONINCt−1 0.008 -0.061* -0.024 0.597 
 (0.016) (0.037) (0.038)  
     
Constant -35.055***    
 (4.517)    
Sec20  46.565***   
  (13.033)   
FHC   4.562  
   (3.534)  
Sec20=FHC    9.859*** 
     
Observations 39,480    
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.213    
Number of BHCs 1,004    
Time Fixed Yes    




(Table 1.6 continued)  
Panel C. Short-term institutions 












       
LIQt−1 0.029*** -0.032 0.000 1.084 
 (0.008) (0.028) (0.016)  
EQTt−1 0.197*** 0.419** -0.130** 6.891*** 
 (0.031) (0.204) (0.059)  
SIZEt−1 0.381* -1.688*** -0.442*** 6.519** 
 (0.212) (0.469) (0.138)  
PRFt−1 -0.018 -0.220 -0.039 0.207 
 (0.111) (0.359) (0.223)  
LQLTt−1 0.043 0.294 0.579** 0.728 
 (0.069) (0.222) (0.264)  
QRETt−1 0.008*** -0.007 0.001 0.418 
 (0.001) (0.012) (0.003)  
QVOLt−1 -0.795*** 2.309** 0.731 1.568 
 (0.238) (1.105) (0.721)  
EFFt−1 0.202*** -0.095 -0.037 0.184 
 (0.071) (0.127) (0.059)  
DTt−1 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 6.835*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)  
DHt−1 0.000 -0.018 0.012 4.50888 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.016)  
NONINCt−1 -0.025** -0.145** 0.005 6.674*** 
 (0.011) (0.057) (0.014)  
     
Constant -6.743**    
 (2.884)    
Sec20  29.043***   
  (8.563)   
FHC   6.846***  
   (2.186)  
Sec20=FHC    6.361** 
     
Observations 39,480    
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.132    
Number of BHCs 1,004    
Time Fixed Yes    




(Table 1.6 continued)  
Panel D. Long-term institutions 












       
LIQt−1 0.014 0.085* 0.012 1.669 
 (0.015) (0.050) (0.029)  
EQTt−1 0.507*** -0.924*** 0.146 26.55*** 
 (0.061) (0.190) (0.120)  
SIZEt−1 3.719*** -1.465 -0.525* 0.816 
 (0.405) (1.010) (0.292)  
PRFt−1 -0.088 -0.538 -0.200 0.437 
 (0.127) (0.473) (0.239)  
LQLTt−1 -0.401*** -0.011 0.138 0.140 
 (0.090) (0.303) (0.286)  
QRETt−1 -0.003 0.006 0.001 0.539 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)  
QVOLt−1 -0.354 -1.970 0.119 1.606 
 (0.328) (1.370) (1.043)  
EFFt−1 -0.038 -0.057 0.001 0.104 
 (0.121) (0.165) (0.096)  
DTt−1 -0.005*** 0.002* 0.001 1.722 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
DHt−1 -0.009 -0.047 0.036 4.192** 
 (0.023) (0.041) (0.030)  
NONINCt−1 0.030 0.042 -0.004 0.399 
 (0.024) (0.071) (0.031)  
     
Constant -51.431***    
 (5.497)    
Sec20  28.641   
  (17.524)   
FHC   6.963  
   (4.474)  
Sec20=FHC    1.475 
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(Table 1.6 continued)     












     
Observations 39,480    
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.502    
Number of BHCs 1,004    
Time Fixed Yes    
BHC Fixed Yes       
Notes: this table repeats the regression in the above table for different institution types.  
𝐼𝑂_𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽0 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐20 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝐻𝐶 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
𝛾1 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐20 + 𝛾2 ∗ 𝐹𝐻𝐶 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝐼𝑂_𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 represents one of the following four institutional ownership measures: IO_Indp, 
IO_Grey, IO_ST and IO_LT. We provide the results for IO_Indp in Panel A, results for IO_Grey in 
Panel B, results for IO_ST in Panel C and results for IO_LT in Panel D. Sec20 is a dummy variable 
that equals one for BHC-quarters when a BHC has established Section 20 subsidiary and zero 
otherwise. FHC is a dummy variable that equals one for non-Section 20 BHCs that are designated 
as Financial Holding Companies after the enactment of GLBA and zero otherwise. Other variables 
are defined as in Table 1.1. Column 1 reports the regression coefficients on risk measures; Column 
2 reports the regression coefficients on risk measures’ interaction terms with Sec20 and Column 3 
reports the regression coefficients on risk measures’ interaction terms with FHC. In Column 4, we 
provide F-test on equality of coefficients on risk measures’ interaction terms with Sec20 and FHC. 
We include time-fixed and BHC-fixed effects to control for non-observable heterogeneities among 
BHCs and different quarters. We cluster standard error at BHC level to allow for intragroup 
correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
In Panel A, we examine the impact of expansion of bank power on independent institutional 
ownership. From the positive and significant coefficients of Sec20 and FHC, we can see that 
independent institutions welcome expansion of bank power. Furthermore, the F-test fails to reject 
that independent institutions treat early adopters and late adopters differently. When we look at the 
coefficients of interaction terms, we see that independent institutions become less risk-averse when 
investing in Section 20 BHCs and FHCs, though they do react to different bank characteristics 
differently with Section 20 than to FHCs. The only risk-taking activities independent institutions 
oppose for FHCs is using derivative for tradings.  
31 
 
In Panel B, we move on to grey institutions. The coefficients on the two dummies and F-test 
indicate that only Section 20 banks that attempt to expand bank power early attract more grey 
institution investment. Grey institutions are willing to put up with Section 20 BHCs with lower 
equity ratio, smaller size and less use of derivative for hedging purpose; and FHCs with higher stock 
return volatilities. However, they still oppose using of derivatives for tradings among FHCs. 
In Panel C, we investigate the ownership of short-term institutions. Both the first attempt to 
expand into non-traditional banking business and industry wide deregulation attract more short-term 
institutional ownership, though the incremental effect is more pronounced for the early adopters. 
When investing in Section 20 banks, short-term institutions appear to prefer BHCs that are better 
capitalized and/or less dependent on non-interest income; at the same time they relaxed their 
requirement on bank size and stock return volatility. When investing in FHCs, they become even 
more aggressive in that they are willing to hold FHCs with lower capital ratio, smaller size, and 
lower-quality loans.  
Lastly, we investigate the impact of expansion of bank power on long-term institutional 
ownership in Panel D. Neither the early attempts to expand bank power nor the industry-wide 
deregulation appears to be able to attract more long-term institutional ownership directly. In 
addition, long-term institutions seem to require additional liquidity when investing in Section 20 
BHCs though smaller size or derivative trading seem to become more acceptable to long-term 
institutions. When investing in FHCs, the only change is the relaxed requirement on size. 
In summary, all types of institutions but long-term institutors welcome expansion of bank 
power, may it be the early strategy of establishing Section 20 subsidiaries or later attempt to become 
financial holding companies. In addition, all types of institutions relax their restrictions on certain 
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bank risk taking/characteristics to some level for BHCs with expansion into non-traditional banking 
business, i.e. Section 20 banks and FHCs.  
1.4.4 Institutional trading and future BHC performance with the establishment of Section 20 
subsidiary and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act for different institutions 
In this section we investigate whether trading behaviors of different institutions have 
different predicting power and whether they are affected by Section 20 or GLB. We first examine 
how expansion of bank power affects the predicting power of institutional trading on banks’ stock 
performance. We regress different stock performance measures on institutional trading and its 
interactions with different dummies and report the results in Table 1.7.  
In Panel A, we look at independent and grey institutions. The trading of independent 
institutions can predict one-year buy-and-hold stock returns as well as tail risk for BHCs without 
non-trading banking business. In addition, the trading of independent institutions has even 
incremental power in predicting one-year and two-year returns for Section 20 banks. However, the 
predicting power in tail risk is compromised with Section 20 banks. The trading of grey institutions 
can predict one-year and two-return returns as well as stock tail risk for BHCs without expanded 
power. But the predicting power in one-year return is negatively affected by establishment of Section 
20 subsidiaries though grey institutions seem to be able to better predict future abnormal returns for 
Section 20 and FHC banks. In Panel B, we turn to short-term and long-term institutions. The trading 
of short-term institutions appears only able to predict one-year return for FHCs. The trading of long-
term institutions can predict one-year, two-year returns and stock tail risk for BHCs without 
expanded power, but such predicting power is reduced by either establishment of Section 20 or the 
designation of FHCs.  
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Table 1.7 Institutional trading and BHC future performance with the establishment of Section 20 subsidiary and GLB 
Panel A. Independent and grey institutions  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡+1 𝑅𝐸𝑇1𝑦𝑟 𝑅𝐸𝑇2𝑦𝑟 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡+1 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡+1 𝑅𝐸𝑇1𝑦𝑟 𝑅𝐸𝑇2𝑦𝑟 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡+1 
                  
 Independent Institutions Grey Institutions 
𝛥𝐼𝑂_𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 0.005 0.172** 0.020 -0.031*** 0.006 0.078* 0.164** -0.011** 
 (0.006) (0.073) (0.105) (0.007) (0.008) (0.044) (0.075) (0.005) 
𝛥𝐼𝑂_𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 -0.010 0.400** 0.552** 0.060* 0.039** -0.406* -0.351 0.000 
∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐20 (0.017) (0.191) (0.276) (0.031) (0.017) (0.229) (0.307) (0.009) 
𝛥𝐼𝑂_𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 0.002 -0.004 0.050 0.003 0.038** -0.649** -0.299 0.024** 
∗ 𝐹𝐻𝐶 (0.012) (0.211) (0.324) (0.011) (0.015) (0.253) (0.326) (0.012) 
Sec20 0.038 -8.584** -16.872** 0.569 0.037 -8.507** -16.762** 0.583 
 (0.148) (3.474) (6.892) (0.364) (0.148) (3.473) (6.890) (0.365) 
FHC -0.087 -2.676 -3.934 -0.148 -0.088 -2.658 -3.924 -0.150 
 (0.068) (1.935) (3.698) (0.130) (0.067) (1.939) (3.703) (0.130) 
         
Constant 0.757*** -4.369** 35.002*** 4.222*** 0.757*** -4.378** 34.961*** 4.210*** 
 (0.208) (1.908) (4.072) (0.152) (0.208) (1.903) (4.080) (0.152) 
         
Observations 38,480 34,307 32,406 38,480 38,480 34,307 32,406 38,480 
# BHCs 999 1,000 976 999 999 1,000 976 999 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.015 0.404 0.427 0.438 0.015 0.404 0.427 0.437 
Date Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B. Short-term and long-term institutions   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡+1 𝑅𝐸𝑇1𝑦𝑟 𝑅𝐸𝑇2𝑦𝑟 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡+1 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡+1 𝑅𝐸𝑇1𝑦𝑟 𝑅𝐸𝑇2𝑦𝑟 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡+1 
                  
 Short-term Institutions Long-term Institutions 
𝛥𝐼𝑂_𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 -0.004 0.051 -0.074 -0.007 0.005 0.086* 0.106* -0.011*** 
 (0.007) (0.047) (0.083) (0.005) (0.004) (0.050) (0.058) (0.004) 
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(Table 1.7 continued)       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡+1 𝑅𝐸𝑇1𝑦𝑟 𝑅𝐸𝑇2𝑦𝑟 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡+1 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡+1 𝑅𝐸𝑇1𝑦𝑟 𝑅𝐸𝑇2𝑦𝑟 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡+1 
𝛥𝐼𝑂_𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 0.010 0.194 0.443 0.001 0.007 -0.113 -0.022 0.025*** 
∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐20 (0.019) (0.369) (0.583) (0.035) (0.012) (0.255) (0.345) (0.008) 
𝛥𝐼𝑂_𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 -0.010 0.437** 0.423 -0.019 0.015 -0.576*** -0.377* 0.012 
∗ 𝐹𝐻𝐶 (0.015) (0.193) (0.319) (0.016) (0.010) (0.166) (0.205) (0.009) 
Sec20 0.036 -8.481** -16.755** 0.582 0.033 -8.474** -16.761** 0.579 
 (0.147) (3.480) (6.890) (0.365) (0.148) (3.478) (6.891) (0.365) 
FHC -0.085 -2.713 -4.009 -0.148 -0.091 -2.477 -3.843 -0.152 
 (0.067) (1.938) (3.706) (0.130) (0.068) (1.938) (3.706) (0.131) 
         
Constant 0.758*** -4.388** 34.981*** 4.203*** 0.753*** -4.503** 29.475*** 4.218*** 
 (0.209) (1.905) (4.083) (0.153) (0.208) (1.909) (3.751) (0.152) 
         
Observations 38,480 34,307 32,406 38,480 38,480 34,307 32,406 38,480 
Number of 
BHCs 999 1,000 976 999 999 1,000 976 999 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.015 0.404 0.427 0.437 0.015 0.404 0.427 0.437 
Date Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: this table provides the regression results of future BHC stock performance on institutional trading, its interaction with Sec20, its 
interaction with GLB, its interaction with Sec20, and GLB, and controls for different types of institutions. Sec20 is a dummy variable 
that equals one for BHC-quarters when a BHC has established Section 20 subsidiary and zero otherwise. FHC is a dummy variable that 
equals one for non-Section 20 BHCs that are designated as Financial Holding Companies after the enactment of GLBA and zero 
otherwise. 𝑅𝐸𝑇1𝑦𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝐸𝑇2𝑦𝑟 are buy-and-hold return over the next one year and the next two years, respectively. Following Acharya, 
Pedersen, Philippon and Richardson (2010), tail risk is calculated as the negative of the average return on the BHC’s stock during the 
5% worst returns days for the BHC’s stock over the quarter. Hence, higher value indicates higher tail risk. Other variables are defined 
as in Table 1.1. For brevity, coefficients of control variables and constants are not reported in the table. Panel A provides the results for 
independent and grey institution; Panel B provides the results for short-term and long-term institutions. We include time-fixed and BHC-
fixed effects to control for non-observable heterogeneities among BHCs and different quarters. We cluster standard error at BHC level 
to allow for intragroup correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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We then examine the relation between institutional trading and BHCs’ operating 
performance for different types of institutions and provide the results in Table 1.8. Grey institutions 
and long-term institutions seem to perform best when predicting future operating performance 
among BHCs not expanded into non-banking business as their tradings are positively related to 
return on assets and negatively related to loan loss provision. Followed by independent institutions, 
whose trading can predict ROA for non-expanded BHCs. However, the increased opacity associated 
with expansion of bank power negatively affects the trading performance of independent institutions 
and short-term institutions. On the other hand, grey institutions and long-term institutions do not 
perform significantly better when it comes to predicting the operating performance for Section 20 
BHCs or FHCs.  
1.5 Conclusion 
In this essay, we investigate the investment preferences of institutions when investing in U.S. bank 
holding companies (BHCs) as well as the impacts of expansion of bank power on institutional 
investing in U.S. banking industry to shed lights on the roles of institutional investors in the financial 
services industry. We first establish that when investing in BHCs, institutions still follow a “prudent” 
investment strategy as they invest more in BHCs that hold more liquid assets, are better capitalized 
and larger in size, hold better quality loans, have lower stock return volatility and engage less in 
derivative tradings. We then investigate changes in institutional investors’ investment preferences 
in response to two particular events – the establishment of Section 20 subsidiaries and the enactment 
of GLBA. Our results suggest that in general institutional investors welcome the expansion of bank 
power into non-bank activities, it’s especially so for the early adopters. The positive relation between 




Table 1.8 Institutional trading and BHC fundamentals with the establishment of Section 20 subsidiary and GLB for  
different types of institutions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑡+1 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑡+1 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑡+1 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑡+1 
  
  
Independent Institutions  
  
Grey Institutions  
  
Short-term Institutions  
  
Long-term Institutions  
𝛥𝐼𝑂_𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 0.005** -0.003 0.004*** -0.002* -0.003 0.002 0.004*** -0.002*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝛥𝐼𝑂_𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 -0.011* 0.011** 0.000 -0.000 -0.007 0.008* 0.002 -0.003 
∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐20 (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
𝛥𝐼𝑂_𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 -0.002 0.005 0.006 -0.002 0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.003 
∗ 𝐹𝐻𝐶 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Sec20 0.143** -0.067 0.140** -0.064 0.140** -0.064 0.139** -0.063 
 (0.066) (0.051) (0.066) (0.051) (0.066) (0.051) (0.066) (0.051) 
FHC 0.110*** -0.071*** 0.110*** -0.070*** 0.110*** -0.070*** 0.108*** -0.069*** 
 (0.031) (0.021) (0.031) (0.021) (0.031) (0.021) (0.031) (0.021) 
         
Constant 0.236*** 0.043*** 0.237*** 0.043*** 0.237*** 0.043*** 0.233*** 0.044*** 
 (0.022) (0.016) (0.022) (0.016) (0.022) (0.016) (0.022) (0.016) 
         
Observations 38,527 38,527 38,527 38,527 38,527 38,527 38,527 38,527 
# BHCs 999 999 999 999 999 999 999 999 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.303 0.349 0.303 0.348 0.302 0.348 0.303 0.349 
Date Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table provides the regression results of future BHC performance on aggregate institutional trading, its interaction with Sec20, 
its interaction with GLB, its interaction with Sec20, and FHC, and controls. Sec20 is a dummy variable that equals one for BHC-
quarters when a BHC has established Section 20 subsidiary and zero otherwise. FHC is a dummy variable that equals one for non-
Section 20 BHCs that are designated as Financial Holding Companies after the enactment of GLBA and zero otherwise. We use 
ROA to measure BHC profitability. LLP is loan loss provision over total assets. We include time-fixed and BHC-fixed effects to 
control for non-observable heterogeneities among BHCs and different quarters. We cluster standard error at BHC level to allow 
for intragroup correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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More importantly, the expansion of bank power definitely changes how different 
institutions view certain bank characteristics. Loosely speaking, institutions are willing to take on 
more risk when investing in BHCs with the expansion of bank power; again, the effect is most 
significant for early adopters of non-banking power. The trading predictability analysis of bank 
performance produce mixed results but, in general, suggests that the increase in bank opaqueness 
appears to enhance information advantages of grey and long-term institutional investors relative 
to those of independent and short-term institutional investors, especially when focusing on BHCs’ 
operating performance. Hence, the expansion of bank power attracts more institutional investment 
to those with practice in non-traditional banking areas. But at the same time, the increased opacity 
makes it more challenging for institutional investors to make informed investment/trading 
decisions. The complicated patterns in institutional investing preferences and bank performance 
predictability suggest that the impact of GLB Act depends not only on bank type but also depends 
on institutional investor type as they are different along investment objectives and information 
advantages.       
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Chapter 2. Do Institutional Investors Know Banks Better? Evidence from 
Institutional Trading Surrounding the 2008 Financial Crisis 
2.1 Introduction 
Institutional investing in the stocks of banks has increased dramatically for the past decade in U.S.; 
the median institutional ownership in bank holding companies (BHCs) has increased from around 
10% in 2001 to more than 40% in 2013. However, systematic evidence regarding their roles in the 
banking industry is scarce despite the fact that banks provide important services in the economy 
and the governance of banks is more important than ever since the 2008 financial crisis (Becht et 
al. (2011)). In U.S. alone, this crisis wiped out over 50% market capitalization, led to drastic 
deterioration in financial institutions’ balance sheets and fire sales due to the run on the shadow 
banking system. The catastrophic collapse of subprime mortgage securitization market raises the 
important question on how securitization affects lenders’ screening incentives. Keys, Mukherjee, 
Seru, and Vig (2010) empirically examine this question and conclude that the screening standard 
of subprime mortgages is adversely affected by securitization practices. 
  With hindsight, it is obvious that some banks had taken excessive risk prior to the crisis 
that led to their subsequent collapses and tremendous losses of equity value. It then raises the 
questions how much institutional investors have anticipated this event and what role they played 
in the banking industry prior to the 2008 financial crisis. In this paper, we investigate these 
questions to shed light on the potential for institutional investors to be bank monitors. Empirical 
literature has documented institutional investors’ monitoring role in the manufacturing sectors.  
For example, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998) show that institutions with large ownership positions 
often have access to board members and senior managers. Using invested firms’ decisions on 
mergers and acquisitions, Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) show that only concentrated holdings by 
independent long-term institutions are related to post-merger performance and make withdrawal 
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of bad bids more likely. They also find that these institutions make long-term portfolio adjustments 
rather than trading for short-term gain and only sell in advance of very bad outcomes.  
  We follow the spirit of Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) in this study, but with an important 
twist to fit our purpose. We postulate that grey institutions, i.e., banks and insurance companies, 
have more information on BHCs with high exposure to the risk associated with securitization 
activities than do independent institutions, i.e. pension funds, investment companies and advisers. 
Banks are in the same business with other banks, they should know other banks better. Insurance 
companies are active participants in the securitization business by being the investors of these 
products or the insurers of mortgage backed securities. Both roles played by insurance companies 
suggest that they have the incentives to monitor banks. However, the premium received from 
insuring these securitized products can also taint their incentives. The case of AIG is a gruesome 
example. Nonetheless, in any case, these grey institutions are likely to have more information than 
independent institutions through their own business lines. 
  On the other hand, given institutional investors’ experience and expertise in investing, 
independent institutions also have incentives to produce information. Extant literature also 
documents evidence that institutional trading is motived by the skills and information they possess. 
For example, Yan and Zhang (2009) find that stocks experiencing the largest increase in short-
term institutional holdings have significantly higher earnings surprises and earnings announcement 
abnormal returns over the subsequent four quarters than stocks experiencing the largest decrease 
in short-term institutional holdings. Given the complex incentives of grey institutions and the 
normal investment incentives of independent investors, it is indeed an empirical issue, how they 
have traded invested banks prior to the financial crisis. 
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  The 2008 crisis is definitely qualified to be a very bad outcome. To protect their 
investments, better informed institutional investors regardless of their investment horizons should 
reduce their holdings of banks that have a high potential of collapsing. Using BHCs’ reported 
securitization level in FR Y-9C, we find that grey institutions reduce aggregate holdings in BHCs 
at least 6 months before the crisis hit. More strikingly, they reduce holdings in high-exposure 
BHCs at least one year before the crisis hit. Independent institutions also reduce their holdings in 
high-exposure BHCs sometime before the crisis. The results are robust even after controlling for 
heterogeneity among BHCs and potential endogeneity issues. 
  The securitization information obtained in FR Y-9C only shows the quantity of 
involvement in securitization. But the volume of activities does not necessarily translate into worse 
quality of deals. In this paper, we utilize a unique dataset, BBx dataTM, provided by BlackBox 
Logic to formally examine deal quality. 𝐵𝐵𝑥 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑇𝑀 covers over 90% of the U.S non-agency 
residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) market. It contains more than 7,400 deals, 21 
million loans, and over 740 million remittance records dating back to 1999. The coverage includes 
all the mortgage market sectors, i.e., Jumbo A, Prime, Subprime, and Alt A deals. To match BHCs 
with deals they issued, we use the deal identifications provided in BBx Data to look up each deal’s 
prospectus (Form 424B5) in SEC EDGAR and find the issuer for the deal from the prospectus. 
We are able to identify 2,152 deals whose issuers are in our BHC sample over the period of 2001-
2013. 
  When we add BBX deal quality measures and confine ourselves to only issuing BHCs, we 
find that grey institutions tilt their investment towards BHCs that issue safer securitization deals 
prior to the crisis. Specifically, we find that grey institutions prefer BHCs that issue deals with 
higher documentation level and higher proportion of owner-occupied properties over the four 
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quarters leading up to the crisis; they also tilt their portfolios away from BHCs that issue deals 
with missing FICO or combined CLTV information. In contrast, independent institutions appear 
to increase holdings in BHCs that issue riskier deals; for example, deals with lower documentation 
levels, lower proportion of prime mortgages, and smaller proportion of owner-occupied properties 
over the same pre-crisis period. The ownership of independent institutions also loads positively on 
deals with no FICO scores. 
  Finally, to further test whether the trading is information driven, we investigate whether 
the trading of institutions before crisis can predict BHCs’ stock performance and operating 
performance during the crisis. We perform an event study on the Lehman Bankruptcy. We find 
that the trading of both grey institutions and independent institutions before the crisis can predict 
BHCs’ event day returns, but grey institutions do a much better job in predicting event returns for 
high-exposure BHCs. Furthermore, we find no evidence of price reversal for high-exposure BHCs 
based on the trading of grey institutions. The evidence lends more support to the conjecture that 
the trading of grey institutions is driven by the better information they possess instead of negative 
fund flows they experience before the crisis. We also find some evidence that the pre-crisis trading 
of grey institutions can predict high-exposure BHCs’ profitability during the crisis.  
  To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first paper systematically examining the role 
of institutional investors in the banking industry surrounding the 2008 crisis. The closest paper 
that we can find is by  Cziraki (2013) who uses bank executives’ trading in their own banks’ stocks 
to infer their knowledge about the impendent crisis and finds that insiders of banks with a high 
exposure to the housing market sell 39% more equity than insiders of low-exposure banks. Unlike 
Cziraki (2013) who uses the correlation between the returns on the Barclays index of BBB-rated 
collateralized mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and the stock returns of the banks during July 
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2007 – December 2008 to proxy a bank’s exposure to the housing market, we use a more direct 
measure—BHCs’ reported securitization level in FR Y-9C. We also obtain specific securitization 
deal information in BBx dataset and formally examine the FICO score, combined loan-to-value 
ratio, documentation level, mortgage owner status, and proportion of prime mortgages in deals 
issued by BHCs. 
  In addition, this paper also contributes to literature in the role of institutional investors in 
the financial markets. As Becht et al. (2011) point out, the evidence of shareholder oversight in 
the banking industry is scarce despite its importance. We fill the gap by documenting the trading 
patterns of institutional investors prior to the 2008 Crisis. We show that institutional investors, 
particularly insurance companies and banks, are concerned about the subprime mortgage 
securitization practices in some BHCs prior to the 2008 crisis. Their votes with their feet suggest 
that these grey institutions oppose such risk-taking behaviors of some BHCs, which failed 
catastrophically during the crisis. However, the lack of evidence from independent investors and 
the magnitude of trading effects from grey institutions suggest that it is insufficient to entirely rely 
on institutional investors to monitor the banking industry. Our analysis, thus, also adds to the 
literature on governance through trading, (e.g., Edmans and Manso (2011) and Chang, Lin, Ma 
(2014) ), that trading of institutional investors can serve as a commitment device that punish or 
reward firms making the decisions they make.        
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We describe our date sources and 
definitions of key variables in Section 2.2, and provide descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 




2.2 Data Sources and Variable Construction 
2.2.1 Sample selection and BHC characteristics  
To construct our sample, we start with the “Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2013 CRSP-FRB 
link.”9 The linking table includes 1,289 PERMCO-RSSD links from January 1, 1990 to September 
30, 2012. The table reports name, entity type, entity ID, PERMCO, as well as the starting and 
ending dates for the link. The entity ID (RSSD9001) is the primary identifier for reporting 
institutions. It never changes and is never reused. We only keep the entities listed as “Bank Holding 
Company”, i.e., we exclude “Commercial Bank” and “Thrift Holding Company”. Furthermore, 
we exclude from our sample the BHCs that were not held by any institutional investors over the 
sample period. We obtain the financial data for sample BHCs from FR Y-9C maintained by Federal 
Reserve Board of Chicago. Our sample starts from 2001 as it’s the first year when the Y9-C began 
reporting securitization by asset type; and our sample ends in 2013. We get stock return 
information from CRSP daily stock file.  
Following Peria and Schumkler (2001), and Hadad, Agusman, Monroe, Gasbarro and 
Zumwalt (2011), we construct several BHC characteristic measures. Appendix A describes the 
detail variable items used from Y-9C reports. Below we discuss the economic meaning of these 
variables: 
(1) Liquidity risk. We measure a BHC’s balance sheet liquidity by the ratio of liquid assets 
over total assets (LIQ). 
(2) Credit risk or loan quality. We compute the sum of loans past due 90 days or more and 
loans not accruing for bad loans, scaled by total assets (LQLT). 
                                                          




(3) Capital adequacy. We use total equity capital over total assets (EQT). 
(4) Profitability. We use return on assets (PRF).  
(5) Insolvency risk. We use Z-score to capture a BHC’s insolvency risk; it equals the return on 
assets plus the capital asset ratio, 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝐸𝑄𝑇
𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴⁄ . It measures the number of standard 
deviations that profits must fall to drive a BHC into insolvency. It’s essentially a measure 
of the distance to default for a given BHC. 
(6) Efficiency. We use the ratio of noninterest expenditures to total assets (EFF). 
Following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), we also collect the following measures for our sample 
BHCs: 
(7) Reliance on off-balance-sheet activity. We use the ratio of noninterest income over total 
net income (NONINC). 
(8) Time-varying risk preferences. We use BHC’s derivative trading over assets (DT) and 
BHC’s derivative hedging over assets (DH).   
To measure securitization-related activities, we estimate the following measures: 
(9) Private MBS (PMBS). It’s calculated as the total value of private-label mortgage-backed 
securities held in both trading and investment portfolios.  
(10) Mortgage securitization. We measure a BHC’s mortgage securitization activities by the 
sum of mortgage and home equity lines securitized over total assets (SCT_MGG). 
(11) Aggregate asset securitization. To measure a BHC’s aggregate exposure to asset 
securitization, we use the sum of all securitized assets over total assets, included asset 
categories are securitized family residential loans, home equity lines, credit card 
receivables, and other consumer loans, and commercial & industrial loans (SCT_All). 
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  We also include the logarithm of BHC assets (Size) as total assets have been shown to be 
a proxy for bank diversification potential (Brewer, 1989). Larger banks may also be redeemed 
safer by investors due to “too big to fail”. Lastly, we add two BHC stock performance measure. 
QRET is for compounded stock return over the quarter using BHCs’ daily return data; QVOL is 
quarterly return volatility, calculated as the variance of daily returns over the quarter. We winsorize 
variables at the one and 99 percentile to mitigate the impact of outliers.   
2.2.2 Institutional ownership 
We collect institutional holding data from Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13f) Database. 
Institutional investors that use United States mail in their business and exercise investment 
discretion over $100 million are required to file Form 13F with SEC pursuant to Section 13(f) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Form 13F filings provide information regarding the securities 
holdings of institutional investors. Exceptions are small positions that include fewer than 10,000 
shares of a given issuer and the aggregate fair market value of the same position is less than 
$200,000. The commonly used databases for institutional holdings are the Thomson Financial sets 
that are also known as CDA/Spectrum 13f database. The Thomson sets are available on WRDS as 
part of the Thomson Financial Network (TFN).  
TFN classifies institutions into five types: 1) banks; 2) insurance companies; 3) investment 
companies and their managers; 4) independent investment advisers; and 5) others (pension funds, 
endowments, etc.). One issue with TFN 13f data is that there are serious classification errors in 
recent years. Many banks (TYPECODE=1) and Independent Investment Advisors 
(TYPECODE=4) are misclassified as others (TYPECODE=5) in 1998 and beyond. Previous 
studies usually correct this problem by replacing a manager’s TYPECODE after 1998 with the 
TYPECODE reported before 1998. After further investigating the data, we find that 
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misclassification can happen to institutions whose post-1998 TYPECODE is not 5 as well. For 
example, Brown Brothers Harriman & CO had a TYPECODE of “5” up to September 30, 2008 
after which its TYPECODE was recorded as “1”; or Epoch Investment Partners, Inc. whose 
TYPECODE changed from “5” before December 31, 2006 to “4” afterwards. To fully address this 
issue, we replace an institution’s later date TYPECODE with its earliest date TYPECODE. 
Because the MGRNO identifiers are reused in TFN 13(f), we assign a new unique identifier to 
each included institution based on its MGRNAME, MGRNO, and RDATE in TFN. Whenever in 
doubt, we double check the institution’s information on EDGAR and the institution’s website (if 
a website is available). Then we further confine our sample to institutions that have ever invested 
in BHCs. We merge BHCs and their institutional investors using CUSIP.  
  Literature has shown that institutional investors differ significantly depending on the types 
of investment strategies, horizons, and information advantages.  In the context of investing in 
BHCs, institutional investors may have different degrees of relationships with these BHCs. For 
example, insurance companies and banks might have stronger business ties with BHCs that they 
invest; while other institutions, such as independent advisers may be more independent from these 
BHCs. Following Chen, Harford, and Li (2007), we group institutions into two categories: we 
classify types 3 and 4 as well as public pension funds from type 5 as independent institutions; and 
types 1 and 2 as well as the remaining institutions from type 5 as grey institutions, we denote this 
as Definition 1; in alternative specification, we include only banks and insurance companies as 
grey institutions to better fit our research purpose, we denote this as Definition 2. 
  It is intuitive that bank-type institutional investors are better informed about BHCs’ 
business and performance than do independent institutions due to their own operations in the same 
business and syndication relationships with invested BHCs. For insurance company-type 
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institutional investors, they also enjoy developed business relationship with BHCs and/or are 
active participants of securitization market and CDS market. For example, in an introductory 
statement about its mortgage insurance product, “United Guaranty”, AIG states that “private 
mortgage insurance helps lenders by providing protection against the risk of a borrower defaulting 
on a mortgage loan…United Guaranty provides responsible risk management with its risk-based 
pricing model, which prices the mortgage insurance premium according to the unique risk of each 
loan.”10  
  Similarly, Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-D Trust states in its prospectus 
“WFHM supplements the mortgage loan underwriting process with either its own proprietary 
scoring system or scoring systems developed by third parties such as Freddie Mac’s Loan 
Prospector, Fannie Mae’s Desktop Underwriter or scoring systems developed by private mortgage 
insurance companies”  
  In addition, insurance companies are also involved in securitization deals directly. For 
example, J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-HE2 states in its prospectus “One or more 
insurance companies may issue a financial guaranty insurance policy covering certain payments 
to be made on net interest margin securities to be issued by a separate trust and secured by all or a 
portion of the Class C certificates and the Class P Certificates.” For another example, Morgan 
Stanley ABS Capital I INC. Trust 2003-HE1 states in its prospectus “…deficiencies in amounts 
otherwise payable on the securities or on specified classes will be covered by insurance policies 
and/or surety bonds provided by one or more insurance companies or sureties.” Thus, it’s 
                                                          
10 Ironically, AIG failed miserably during the crisis. It’ll be interesting to see if other insurance 
companies also have the incentive problem.  
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reasonable to assume that insurance companies also have more information than independent 
institutions.  
We, therefore, construct three different institutional ownership measures and three 
trading variables. Total institutional ownership (IO_Total) is calculated as the ratio of a BHC’s 
total shares held by 13f investors over the BHC’s total shares outstanding. Total institutional 
ownership from grey institutions (IO_Grey) is computed as the percentage of shares outstanding 
held by grey institutions; total institutional ownership from independent institutions (IO_Indp) is 
computed as the percentage of shares outstanding held by independent institutions. 
CHGIO_Total, CHGIO_Grey, and CHGIO_Indp are corresponding trading measures. They are 
defined as the change in institutional ownership from previous quarter for a BHC. 
2.2.3 Deal quality measures 
We obtain the deal quality measures of securitized mortgages from 𝐵𝐵𝑥 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑇𝑀 provided by 
BlackBox Logic. 𝐵𝐵𝑥 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑇𝑀 covers over 90% of the U.S non-agency residential mortgage 
backed securities (RMBS) market. It contains more than 7,400 deals, 21 million loans, and over 
740 million remittance records dating back to 1999. The coverage includes all the mortgage market 
sectors, i.e., Jumbo A, Prime, Subprime, and Alt A deals. To match BHCs with deals they issued, 
we use the deal identifiers provided in BBx Data to look up each deal’s prospectus (Form 424B5) 
in SEC EDGAR and find the issuer for the deal from the prospectus. We are able to identify 2,152 
deals whose issuers are in our BHC sample over the period of 2001-2013. 
  We collect average issue balance and deal issue year as control variables, and the following 
five different deal quality measures from BBx Data: 
(1) Average FICO score for all loans in the deal (FICO);  
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(2) Average documentation level for all loans in the deal (DOC). For each mortgage, BBx 
reports one of the documentation status, “Full Documentation (FD)”, “Low Documentation 
(LD)”, “No Documentation (ND)”, “Reduced Documentation (RD)” and “Unknown (UN)”. 
We assign a value of 1 to mortgages with ND or UN, a value of 2 to mortgages with RD or 
LD, and a value of 3 to mortgages with FD. We then compute the average documentation 
level of all mortgages included in one deal as the deal’s average documentation level.  
(3) Combined loan-to-value (CLTV). BBx reports the ratio of all loan amounts on the property 
at the time of origination to the property value at loan origination for each mortgage. We 
compute the mean value of all mortgages included in one deal as deal’s average CLTV.  
(4) Proportion of prime mortgages in the deal (LSEC). BBx reports the credit sector each 
mortgage belongs, including “Alt-A (AA)”, “Prime (PR)”, “Subprime (SP)”, and “Unknown 
(UN)”. We assign a value of 1 to mortgages with UN or SP, a value of 2 to mortgages with 
AA, and a value of 3 to mortgages with PR. Then we compute the average value of all 
mortgages in one deal as the deal’s average loan sector, the higher the value the higher 
portion of prime mortgages in the deal. 
(5) Property occupancy status. BBx provides occupancy types: “Non Owner Occupied”, 
“Other”, “Owner Occupied”, “Second Home”, “Unknown” and “Vacant”. We assign a value 
of 1 to mortgages recorded as “Owner Occupied” and a value of 0 to the rest mortgages. We 
then compute the average value of all mortgages in one deal as the deal’s average owner-
occupancy. The higher the value, the more properties are owner-occupied in the deal. 
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2.3 Descriptive Statistics 
2.3.1 Descriptive statistics for BHC characteristics 
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for BHC characteristics. Panel A presents the descriptive 
statistics of churn rate and the proportion of blockholders for each type of institutions. We provide 
mean, median, standard deviation, 25th percentile, and 75th percentile for each variable. 
Independent investment advisers and “Others” seem to turn over their portfolio faster than banks 
and insurance companies. And investment companies have higher percentage of blockholders than 
other groups. When we group institutions together based on their potential business ties with the 
BHCs they invest, we find that independent institutions appear to have higher portfolio turnover 
rate and are more likely to be blockholders than grey institutions (it applies to both definitions of 
grey institutions).  
In Panel B we provide the summary statistics of BHC characteristics and institutional 
ownership. The mean and median for BHC size are fairly close, indicating that our size measure 
is fairly symmetrical after taking logarithm of the book value of asset. An average BHC holds 
around 22% liquid assets, has 0.44% return on assets, and keeps around 9.37% of asset value in 
equity capital. 
On average, BHCs spend 2% of assets in noninterest expense. Nonperforming loans, 
estimated by the sum of loans over 90 days late and loans not accruing, take up around 1.2% for 
an average BHC. Z-score has a mean 41, suggesting that the profit must fall at least 41 standard 
deviations to drive an average BHC into insolvency. The distribution of derivatives used for 
trading and hedging are highly skewed, and indicates that not every BHC is equally active in using 
derivatives. For an average BHC, the noninterest income accounts for around 19% of its total net 
income. The securitization-related measures are also skewed, indicating not every BHC is equallty
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Table 2.1 Summary statistics 
Panel A. Sample institution characteristics 
Institution type   Variable   Mean Median Std Dev P25 P75 N 
Banks  Churn rate  0.17 0.13 0.17 0.08 0.21 334,036 
  %BLK5  1.04 0.00 10.13 0.00 0.00 334,584 
Insurance companies  Churn rate  0.20 0.17 0.17 0.11 0.24 117,402 
  %BLK5  0.20 0.00 4.47 0.00 0.00 117,500 
Investment companies  Churn rate  0.21 0.18 0.17 0.11 0.26 139,643 
  %BLK5  4.54 0.00 20.81 0.00 0.00 139,857 
Independent investment 
advisers  Churn rate  0.29 0.23 0.25 0.13 0.37 821,515 
  %BLK5  0.88 0.00 9.33 0.00 0.00 823,664 
Public pension funds  Churn rate  0.11 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.14 91,998 
  %BLK5  0.02 0.00 1.28 0.00 0.00 92,102 
Others  Churn rate  0.68 0.29 0.74 0.14 1.12 4,411 
  %BLK5  0.91 0.00 9.49 0.00 0.00 484,193 
Independent institutions   Churn rate  0.27 0.20 0.23 0.11 0.34 1,053,156 
  %BLK5  1.29 0.00 11.27 0.00 0.00 1,055,623 
Grey institutions (Def. 1)  Churn rate  0.18 0.14 0.17 0.09 0.22 451,438 
  %BLK5  0.82 0.00 9.01 0.00 0.00 452 
Grey institutions (Def. 2)  Churn rate  0.18 0.14 0.19 0.09 0.22 455,849 
  %BLK5  0.87 0.00 9.26 0.00 0.00 936,277 
All institutions  Churn rate  0.24 0.18 0.23 0.10 0.29 1,509,005 
    %BLK5   1.09 0.00 10.38 0.00 0.00 1,991,900 
Panel B. BHC characteristics 




Size  14.63 14.22 1.63 13.49 15.35  23.15%  
LIQ %  22.17 20.49 11.30 14.02 28.66  23.15%  
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(Table 2.1 continued)          




PRF %  0.44 0.48 0.83 0.23 0.81  23.15%  
EQT %  9.37 9.06 2.74 7.70 10.64  23.15%  
EFF %  2.00 1.81 1.29 1.08 2.61  23.15%  
LQLT %  1.18 0.62 1.57 0.28 1.42  23.15%  
Z-score  41.05 31.41 36.81 23.71 45.67  23.15%  
DT %  28.15 0.00 232.44 0.00 0.00  23.15%  
DH %  3.95 0.04 9.96 0.00 3.05  23.15%  
NONINC %  0.19 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.23  23.15%  
SCT_MGG %  1.00 0.00 5.79 0.00 0.00  23.15%  
SCT_ALL %  1.30 0.00 7.05 0.00 0.00  23.15%  
PMBS %  0.58 0.00 1.77 0.00 0.13  23.15%  
QRET %  2.39 1.99 17.81 -5.66 10.50  23.15%  
QVOL (*10,000)  9.64 3.61 21.35 1.95 7.87  23.15%  
IO_Total  29.15 23.14 23.22 9.90 45.43  23.15%  
IO_Grey (Def. 2)  12.60 9.76 10.90 3.48 19.93  23.15%  
IO_Grey (Def. 1)  7.57 5.18 7.59 1.19 12.31  23.15%  
IO_Indp   17.18 13.29 15.00 4.92 26.27  23.15%  
Panel C. Univariate comparison between securitizing and non-securitizing BHCs 
  Non-securitizing   Securitizing 
T-test 
Wilcoxon 
test Variable Mean Median  Mean Median 
Size 14.23 14.00  15.95 15.72 52.18 *** 51.57 *** 
LIQ % 22.04 20.38  22.61 20.84 3.01 *** 3.57 *** 
PRF % 0.42 0.46  0.52 0.54 7.58 *** 10.44 *** 
EQT % 9.35 9.07  9.43 9.02 1.64  1.39  
EFF % 1.99 1.81  2.07 1.82 3.33 *** 1.37  
LQLT % 1.14 0.58  1.28 0.73 4.99 *** 10.55 *** 
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(Table 2.1 continued)      
  Non-securitizing   Securitizing 
T-test 
Wilcoxon 
test Variable Mean Median  Mean Median 
Z-score 42.16 32.04  37.35 29.45 -8.65 *** -9.75 *** 
DT % 3.73 0.00  109.24 0.00 15.06 *** 41.98 *** 
DH % 2.20 0.00  9.75 2.57 29.92 *** 44.46 *** 
NONINC % 0.17 0.15  0.24 0.21 29.36 *** 33.76 *** 
SCT_MGG % 0.00 0.00  4.31 0.00 25.29 *** 84.90 *** 
SCT_ALL % 0.00 0.00  5.61 0.00 27.22 *** 93.24 *** 
PMBS % 0.47 0.00  0.97 0.00 13.76 *** 21.50 *** 
QRET % 2.44 1.99  2.20 1.99 -0.80  -0.26  
QVOL (*10,000) 9.83 3.79  9.00 3.10 -2.37 ** -10.58 *** 
IO_Total 26.07 19.60  39.37 39.29 32.75 *** 32.68 *** 
IO_Grey (Def. 2) 10.95 8.33  18.09 18.42 35.86 *** 35.74 *** 
IO_Grey (Def. 1) 6.22 4.14  12.03 12.09 39.65 *** 40.34 *** 
IO_Indp 15.74 11.42  21.98 20.43 24.26 *** 26.51 *** 
Notes: Panel A presents descriptive statistics of churn rate and percentage of blockholders for different types of institutions as 
well as the institutions as a whole along with the number of institution-BHC-quarters. Churn rate is calculated for each 
institution following Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) and Cella, Ellul and Mariassunta (2013). Blockholders are defined as 
institutions who hold more than 5% shares of the BHC it invests. The definition one (Def.1) of grey institutions include banks, 
insurance companies and all institutions with typecode 5 in 13f that are not public pension funds. The definition two (Def.2) 
of grey institutions include only banks and insurance companies. Panel B reports the summary statistics of BHC characteristics 
as well as their institutional ownership. All variables are as defined in Appendix A.  Panel C presents a univariate comparison 
of BHC characteristics between BHCs that report non-zero asset securitization over the sample period (Securitizing BHCs) 
and those for BHCs that report zero asset securitization over the sample period (Non-securitizing BHCs) over the sample period 
that starts from the beginning of 2001 to the end of 2013. There are 19,388 BHC-quarters in total in the whole sample, among 
which 14,900 are non-securitizing BHC-quarters and 4,488 are securitizing BHC-quarters for this period. The observations are 
at the bank-quarter level. There are 674 unique banks over the whole sample. See Appendix A for variable definitions. Tests 
of difference in mean (median) are t-tests (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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involved in securitization. The value of private-label mortgage-backed securities accounts for 
around 0.6% of its total assets. Average quarterly return for sample BHCs is 2.39% with a variance 
of 0.001.  
On average, institutional investors hold 29.15% of sample BHCs’ shares. Independent 
institutions seem to have a greater ownership in BHCs than grey institutions; but both have 
meaningful existence in BHCs. 
In Panel C, we seek to understand the differences in characteristics between BHCs with 
high exposure to asset securitization and BHCs with low exposure to asset securitization. To do 
so, we aggregate sample BHCs’ reported asset securitization (SCT_ALL) over the whole sample 
period, and then we treat BHCs with non-zero aggregated asset securitization as Securitizing BHCs 
and those with zero aggregated asset securitization as Non-securitizing BHCs. We then perform a 
T-test and Wilcoxon rank test of the values of various BHC characteristics. 
As we can see, Securitizing BHCs are larger in size, hold a slightly bigger percentage 
of liquid assets, are more profitable, spend more on noninterest expense, and hold more bad 
loans, and have smaller distance to insolvency, are much more active in using derivatives for 
trading and hedging purposes than Non-securitizing BHCs. Securitizing BHCs attribute a 
greater percentage of their net income to non-interest-generating activities and hold a greater 
private-label MBS in their portfolios than do Non-securitizing BHCs. Over our sample period, 
Securitizing BHCs also have lower return volatility than Non-securitizing BHCs but the two 
groups do not seem to have different stock returns over the sample period. In terms of 
institutional investment, Securitizing BHCs have significantly higher institutional ownership 




2.3.2 Descriptive statistics for deal characteristics 
We present summary statistics for securitization deal related measures in Table 2.2 Panel A. 
We provide mean, median, standard deviation, 25th percentile and 75th percentile for each 
variable. Along with each variable, we also provide the number of deals that has available 
information to compute the statistic. Even though we are able to match 2,152 deals in total, 
some deals are missing one or more quality measures we use here. Grand mean of FICO scores 
is 700 with a median of 719. Combined loan-to-value has a mean of 79.46%, which tells us the 
average loan amounts on the deal property is about 80% of the property value at the time of 
loan origination. Average documentation level is 1.8, indicating that an average borrower in 
these deals provide some kind of income documentation but not full documentation. Loan 
sector indicator has a mean of 2.4, indicating the average loan lies between Alt-A and prime 
mortgages. Owner status indicator has a mean value of 0.79, suggesting that around 79% 
properties in the deal are the borrowers’ primary residence. In addition, the average amount of 
loan principal outstanding at the time of deal issuance is around 360 thousands.  
In Panel B of Table 2.2, we provide the number of deals issued each year. We can see 
active mortgage securitization activities by the BHCs from year 2002 through 2007. The 
securitization activities slow down after 2008 and we didn’t find any BHC-issuing 
securitization deals after 2009 in our sample. 
 
Table 2.2 Summary statistics for deal characteristics 
Panel A. Deal characteristics 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev P25 P75 N 
FICO 700.47 719.10 49.59 689.57 737.17 1,456 
CLTV 79.46 79.30 7.65 75.44 83.94 1,665 
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(Table 2.2 continued)       
Variable Mean Median Std Dev P25 P75 N 
DOC 1.80 1.92 0.63 1.00 2.29 2,152 
LSEC 2.40 2.85 0.73 1.97 2.97 2,152 
OWNER 0.79 0.91 0.27 0.77 0.95 2,152 
Issue Balance($1,000) 360.93 372.59 239.11 191.59 500.19 2,072 
Panel B. Distribution of securitization deals 
Year # deals issued by BHCs % of all BHC deals 
2001  87   4.04%  
2002  179   8.32%  
2003  270   12.55%  
2004  367   17.05%  
2005  462   21.47%  
2006  449   20.86%  
2007  328   15.24%  
2008  8   0.37%  
2009  2   0.09%  
Total   2,152   100.00%  
Notes: In this table, we report summary statistics for deal characteristics. Deal quality measures 
are from BBx Data. FICO, is the average FICO score for all the mortgages in the deal. DOC is 
the average documentation level for all the mortgages in the deal. BBx reports documentation 
level for each mortgage: “Full Documentation (FD)”, “Low Documentation (LD)”, “No 
Documentation (ND)”, “Reduced Documentation (RD)” and “Unknown (UN)”. We assign a 
value of 1 to mortgages with ND or UN, a value of 2 to mortgages with RD or LD, and a value 
of 3 to mortgages with FD. DOC is the mean value of all mortgage documentation indicators 
in a deal. CLTV, is the average combined loan-to-value for all mortgages in a deal. LSEC is 
the indicator of proportion of prime mortgages in the deal. ). BBx reports the credit sector each 
mortgage belongs, including “Alt-A (AA)”, “Prime (PR)”, “Subprime (SP)”, and “Unknown 
(UN)”. We assign a value of 1 to mortgages with UN or SP, a value of 2 to mortgages with 
AA, and a value of 3 to mortgages with PR. CLTV is then computed as the average of these 
numbers for all the mortgages in a deal. Owner is an indicator of occupancy status of the 
mortgages in a deal. BBx provides occupancy types: “Non Owner Occupied”, “Other”, “Owner 
Occupied”, “Second Home”, “Unknown” and “Vacant”. We assign a value of 1 to mortgages 
recorded as “Owner Occupied” and a value of 0 to the rest mortgages. Owner is then computed 
as the average for all mortgages in one deal. Issue balance, the average amount of loan principal 
outstanding at the time of deal issuance (in $1,000). In Panel A, we report statistics for deal 
quality measures; and in Panel B, we provide the distribution of number of deals issued by 





2.4 Empirical Results 
2.4.1 Institutional trading in BHCs prior to the 2008 Financial Crisis 
We postulate that institutional investors, particularly grey institutions, with their expertise in 
investment and experience in the securitization markets may have some knowledge about the 
impending crisis and revise their assessment of investment prospect in BHCs. Following Ivashina 
and Scharfstein (2010), we define August 2006 to July 2007 as pre-crisis period and create four 
dummies for each of the four quarters leading up to the crisis. We analyze trading of institutional 
investors during these quarters.
Because the 2008 financial crisis is closely related to the excessive risk taking in 
securitization market, one natural question to ask is whether institutional investors discriminate 
between high securitization exposure BHCs and no (or low) exposure BHCs in their investment. 
We use three different proxies to classify BHCs. We first separate BHCs into securitizers and non-
securitizers based on whether they report a non-zero balance of asset securitization on their balance 
sheet. Starting from the third quarter of 2001, securitization by asset type became available in FR 
Y9-C. The reported asset categories are 1-4 Family Residential Mortgage Loans, Home Equity 
Lines, Commercial and Industrial Loans, Credit Card, Auto, and Other Consumer Loans. We first 
construct two continuous variables to proxy for a BHC’s exposure to securitization: SCT_MGG is 
the sum of mortgage and home equity lines securitized over total assets; SCT_ALL is the sum of 
all securitized assets over total assets. The third proxy captures BHCs’ involvement in private-
label mortgage-backed securities (PMBS). PMBS denotes the total value of private-label 
mortgage-backed securities held in both trading and investment portfolios over total assets. 
Following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), we exclude mortgage-backed securities that are either 
issued or guaranteed by government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) as they are less risky. We also 
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create three dummy variables: MGGD takes value of 1 if  SCT_MGG is greater than 0 for a BHC 
and 0 otherwise over the quarter;  ALLD takes value of 1 if  SCT_ALL is greater than 0 for a BHC 
and 0 otherwise over the quarter; and PMBSD takes value of 1 if PMBS is greater than 0 for a 
BHC and 0 otherwise over the quarter. 
  We then employ a difference-in-difference type of analysis by estimating the following 
model for each type of institutional investors, 
𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽0 ∗ 𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽1,𝑘 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑘
4
𝑘=1




+𝛾 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (2.1) 
In the above equation, 𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑡denotes either grey or independent institutional ownership for 
BHC i in quarter t; 𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is one of the above three securitization measures; Dummy 1 – 4 represent 
the third quarter of 2006, the fourth quarter of 2006, the first quarter of 2007, and the second 
quarter of 2007 respectively; 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of BHC characteristics that may affect institutional 
ownership. We also include BHC fixed effect and year fixed effect to control for unobservable 
heterogeneity. We are interested in the coefficients of pre-crisis dummies as well as the coefficients 
of interaction terms between securitization measures and pre-crisis dummies. The results are 
reported in Table 2.3.11 
In Panel A, we report the results using continuous securitization measures. From the 
coefficients on the dummy variables, we see that grey institutions start to sell BHCs two quarters 
before the crisis hit. In addition, when moving on to the interaction terms, we find that grey 
institutions sell BHCs with high-exposure to mortgage securitization in 2006Q3 and they sell 
BHCs with high-exposure to PMBS in each of the four quarters before the crisis. In contrast, 
                                                          
11 All regression analysis is implemented in STATA 12.  
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Table 2.3 Institutional ownership and BHC exposure to securitization 
Panel A. Use continuous securitization measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SCTt: SCT_MGG SCG_ALL PMBS SCT_MGG SCG_ALL PMBS 
Dependent Var: IO_Grey IO_Grey IO_Grey IO_Indp IO_Indp IO_Indp 
              
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑡 0.059*** 0.069*** 0.094 0.050 0.062 0.334*** 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.069) (0.047) (0.044) (0.129) 
Dummy [1 for 2006Q3] 0.232*** 0.217** 0.396*** 0.299** 0.289** 0.281 
 (0.084) (0.085) (0.106) (0.144) (0.146) (0.193) 
Dummy [1 for 2006Q4] 0.842*** 0.830*** 0.995*** 0.499** 0.511** 0.500** 
 (0.124) (0.125) (0.140) (0.203) (0.204) (0.245) 
Dummy [1 for 2007Q1] -0.463*** -0.467*** -0.286* -0.173 -0.152 -0.072 
 (0.145) (0.145) (0.152) (0.225) (0.226) (0.254) 
Dummy [1 for 2007Q2] -0.527*** -0.538*** -0.340*** -0.259 -0.245 -0.124 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.118) (0.234) (0.236) (0.290) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑡 ∗ -0.041* -0.022 -0.200*** -0.074* -0.051 -0.061 
Dummy [1 for 2006Q3] (0.022) (0.020) (0.057) (0.041) (0.038) (0.160) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑡 ∗  -0.012 0.005 -0.169** -0.074** -0.067** -0.088 
Dummy [1 for 2006Q4] (0.025) (0.024) (0.066) (0.035) (0.030) (0.156) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑡 ∗ -0.017 -0.003 -0.192*** -0.046 -0.053 -0.149 
Dummy [1 for 2007Q1] (0.024) (0.022) (0.064) (0.073) (0.061) (0.193) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑡 ∗ -0.003 0.011 -0.187*** -0.027 -0.034 -0.166 
Dummy [1 for 2007Q2] (0.033) (0.027) (0.056) (0.106) (0.086) (0.225) 
       
𝑍_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡−1 -0.096 -0.098 -0.105 0.289 0.288 0.273 
 (0.151) (0.150) (0.150) (0.293) (0.294) (0.294) 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 -0.013 -0.013 -0.017 0.012 0.012 0.001 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
𝑃𝑅𝐹𝑡−1 0.239*** 0.241*** 0.237*** -0.126 -0.125 -0.133 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.138) (0.138) (0.138) 
𝐿𝑄𝐿𝑇𝑡−1 -0.286*** -0.287*** -0.284*** -0.157 -0.158 -0.166 
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(Table 2.3 continued)      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SCTt: SCT_MGG SCG_ALL PMBS SCT_MGG SCG_ALL PMBS 
Dependent Var: IO_Grey IO_Grey IO_Grey IO_Indp IO_Indp IO_Indp 
       
 (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) (0.153) (0.152) (0.152) 
𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑡−1 0.163*** 0.161*** 0.168*** 1.052*** 1.050*** 1.057*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 2.243*** 2.250*** 2.249*** 5.201*** 5.205*** 5.255*** 
 (0.402) (0.397) (0.403) (0.879) (0.877) (0.870) 
𝑄𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝑄𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑡−1 -1.891 -2.184 -1.568 -3.008 -3.279 -2.678 
 (3.047) (3.028) (3.064) (4.510) (4.527) (4.507) 
𝐷𝑇𝑡−1 -0.500*** -0.492*** -0.485*** -0.737*** -0.732*** -0.725*** 
 (0.069) (0.066) (0.076) (0.194) (0.194) (0.200) 
𝐷𝐻𝑡−1 0.887 0.669 1.086 0.111 -0.041 0.208 
 (1.365) (1.354) (1.359) (2.713) (2.682) (2.707) 
𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡−1 1.343 1.194 1.551 0.612 0.467 0.819 
 (1.341) (1.336) (1.320) (2.845) (2.798) (2.903) 
       
Constant -27.249*** -27.349*** -27.294*** -73.261*** -73.334*** -73.975*** 
 (5.641) (5.584) (5.666) (12.523) (12.496) (12.383) 
       
Observations 19,388 19,388 19,388 19,388 19,388 19,388 
Number of BHCs 674 674 674 674 674 674 
Date Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.633 0.631 0.636 0.458 0.458 0.467 
Panel B. Use securitization dummies 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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(Table 2.3 continued)       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SCTt: SCT_MGGD SCG_ALLD PMBSD SCT_MGGD SCG_ALLD PMBSD 
Dependent Var: IO_Grey IO_Grey IO_Grey IO_Indp IO_Indp IO_Indp 
       
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝐷𝑡 0.514 0.588 0.482** -0.304 0.192 0.551 
 (0.537) (0.461) (0.228) (1.240) (0.988) (0.466) 
Dummy [1 for 2006Q3] 0.281*** 0.279*** 0.516*** 0.360** 0.409** 0.683** 
 (0.096) (0.099) (0.149) (0.166) (0.170) (0.279) 
Dummy [1 for 2006Q4] 0.835*** 0.823*** 0.904*** 0.495** 0.547** 0.790** 
 (0.132) (0.134) (0.184) (0.217) (0.222) (0.337) 
Dummy [1 for 2007Q1] -0.431*** -0.442*** -0.161 -0.245 -0.181 0.146 
 (0.147) (0.151) (0.200) (0.240) (0.246) (0.310) 
Dummy [1 for 2007Q2] -0.509*** -0.541*** -0.520*** -0.371 -0.300 -0.021 
 (0.113) (0.121) (0.181) (0.255) (0.262) (0.378) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝐷𝑡 ∗ -0.862* -0.717 -0.673** -1.324 -1.558* -0.942* 
Dummy [1 for 2006Q3] (0.466) (0.446) (0.261) (0.953) (0.873) (0.511) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝐷𝑡 ∗  0.002 0.124 -0.155 -0.784 -1.091 -0.756 
Dummy [1 for 2006Q4] (0.623) (0.581) (0.302) (0.815) (0.757) (0.526) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝐷𝑡 ∗ -0.483 -0.298 -0.633** 0.451 -0.245 -0.718 
Dummy [1 for 2007Q1] (0.583) (0.542) (0.290) (1.174) (1.060) (0.517) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝐷𝑡 ∗ -0.171 0.153 0.004 1.148 0.241 -0.522 
Dummy [1 for 2007Q2] (0.543) (0.549) (0.292) (1.325) (1.150) (0.618) 
       
𝑍_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡−1 -0.107 -0.109 -0.115 0.283 0.281 0.274 
 (0.151) (0.150) (0.149) (0.294) (0.295) (0.295) 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 -0.014 -0.014 -0.016 0.011 0.011 0.009 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
𝑃𝑅𝐹𝑡−1 0.239*** 0.241*** 0.238*** -0.122 -0.124 -0.128 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.138) (0.138) (0.138) 
𝐿𝑄𝐿𝑇𝑡−1 -0.287*** -0.286*** -0.284*** -0.151 -0.155 -0.154 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.153) (0.153) (0.152) 
𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑡−1 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.168*** 1.055*** 1.055*** 1.059*** 
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(Table 2.3 continued)       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SCTt: SCT_MGGD SCG_ALLD PMBSD SCT_MGGD SCG_ALLD PMBSD 
Dependent Var: IO_Grey IO_Grey IO_Grey IO_Indp IO_Indp IO_Indp 
       
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.100) (0.100) (0.099) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 2.215*** 2.203*** 2.201*** 5.211*** 5.185*** 5.148*** 
 (0.407) (0.407) (0.402) (0.896) (0.897) (0.879) 
𝑄𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝑄𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.019*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑡−1 -1.667 -1.667 -2.198 -2.755 -2.808 -3.450 
 (3.057) (3.050) (3.115) (4.505) (4.500) (4.606) 
𝐷𝑇𝑡−1 -0.489*** -0.489*** -0.474*** -0.725*** -0.727*** -0.709*** 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.076) (0.202) (0.202) (0.204) 
𝐷𝐻𝑡−1 0.971 0.996 0.941 0.212 0.181 0.120 
 (1.401) (1.394) (1.369) (2.733) (2.732) (2.724) 
𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡−1 1.495 1.461 1.632 0.851 0.786 0.941 
 (1.345) (1.331) (1.325) (2.914) (2.911) (2.918) 
       
Constant -26.824*** -26.680*** -26.779*** -73.302*** -72.999*** -72.700*** 
 (5.724) (5.724) (5.643) (12.714) (12.717) (12.490) 
       
Observations 19,388 19,388 19,388 19,388 19,388 19,388 
Number of BHCs 674 674 674 674 674 674 
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(Table 2.3 continued)       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SCTt: SCT_MGGD SCG_ALLD PMBSD SCT_MGGD SCG_ALLD PMBSD 
Dependent Var: IO_Grey IO_Grey IO_Grey IO_Indp IO_Indp IO_Indp 
Date Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.636 0.636 0.636 0.457 0.457 0.458 
Notes: We presents the results from regressions of different institutional holdings on BHC risk measures, dummy variables 
for the 4 quarters leading up to the crisis, one of our securitization level measures, as well as the interactions of 
securitization measure and dummy variables. See Appendix A for variable definitions. We obtain BHC securitization 
information from Y-9C. SCT_MGG, the amount of mortgage securitized over total assets. The amount of mortgage 
securitized is obtained by adding outstanding principal balance of assets sold and securitized with recourse or other seller-
provided credit enhancements – home equity lines (BHCKB706) and 1-4 family residential loans (BHCKB705). 
SCT_ALL, the sum of all securitized assets over total assets. All securitized assets value is obtained by adding the values 
of outstanding principal balance of assets sold and securitized with recourse or other seller-provided credit enhancements 
from the following six categories: 1-4 family residential loans (BHCKB705), home equity lines (BHCKB706), credit card 
receivables (BHCKB707), auto loans (BHCKB708), other consumer loans (BHCKB709), and commercial and industrial 
loans (BHCKB710). Private-label MBS (PMBS) is the total value of private-label mortgage-backed securities held in both 
trading and investment portfolios (scaled by total assets); this excludes mortgage backed securities that are either issued 
or guaranteed by government sponsored enterprises. The reported asset categories are 1-4 Family Residential Mortgage 
Loans, Home Equity Lines, Commercial and Industrial Loans, Credit Card, Auto, and Other Consumer Loans. We create 
two dummy variables to identify BHCs that are active securitizers: SCT_MGGD takes value of 1 if a BHC’s sum of 
mortgage and home equity lines securitized over total assets is greater than 0 and 0 otherwise; SCT_ALLD takes value of 
1 if a BHC’s the sum of all securitized assets over total assets is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise. PMBSD takes value of 1 
if a BHC’s holding of private-label MBS is not zero and 0 otherwise. In Panel A, we present the results using continuous 
securitization measures: SCT_MGG, SCT_ALL, and PMBS; in Panel B, we present the results using securitization 
dummies: SCT_MGGD, SCT_ALLD, PMBSD. The results using definition one of grey institutions are provided in 
Appendix E. We include time-fixed and BHC-fixed effects to control for non-observable heterogeneities among BHCs 




independent institutions only sell BHCs with high-exposure to mortgage securitization in 2006Q3 
and 2006Q4 as well as BHCs with high-exposure to asset securitization in 2006Q4. But they do 
not sell BHCs in general or BHCs with high-exposure to PMBS. The results suggest that both 
types of institutions sell BHCs with high-exposure to securitization before the crisis to some extent, 
but grey institutions sell more BHCs in general before the crisis and their selling is more 
pronounced in BHCs holding more private-label MBS.  
Most control variables have their expected signs: both grey and independent institutors 
prefer to hold better capitalized BHCs and larger BHCs but avoid BHCs with excessive derivative 
tradings.  In addition, grey institutions prefer BHCs that are more profitable and have better loan 
quality. By contrast, independent institutions prefer BHCs with lower stock-return volatility. 
We repeat the tests using securitization dummies in Panel B. The results are similar to those 
using continuous variables, though the selling of non-zero PMBS BHCs is somewhat weaker than 
the selling of high-exposure PMBS BHCs by grey institutions.  Furthermore, the selling of non-
zero mortgage BHCs by independent institutions is now insignificant and independent institutions 
also sell some non-zero PMBS BHCs in 2006Q3.
2.4.2 Addressing endogeneity and reverse causality concerns  
In last section, we find evidence that institutions reduce their holdings in high-exposure BHCs 
before the crisis and grey institutions seem to sell more in BHCs that hold riskier PMBS. A few 
concerns may arise in that a BHC’s decision to securitize could be determined endogenously. For 
example, the institution–BHC matching might be nonrandom; some BHCs’ decision to securitize 
may be affected by the percentage of their shares held by institutional investors; or the difference 
in institutional ownership between securitizing and non-securitizing BHCs may reflect other BHC 
characteristics rather than securitization. In this subsection, we provide a series of robustness 
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checks to address this concern. For this subsection, we confine our sample to the four quarters 
immediately before the crisis, i.e., 2006Q3 to 2007Q2. 
Our first robustness test addresses the concern that BHCs are heterogeneous. As Table 2.1 
shows, BHCs that choose to involve in securitization are very different from those that do not. 
These different characteristics could be the main drivers that affect institutional ownership. To 
control for this possibility, we use propensity score matching (PSM). PSM allows us to examine 
institutional ownership of the securitizing BHCs in comparison with a matched control sample of 
non-securitizing BHCs.  
To implement PSM, we first utilize probit regressions with one of our securitization 
dummies (PMBSD, SCT_MGGD and SCT_ALLD) being the dependent variable. The regressions 
can help us to identify BHC characteristics that contribute to a BHC’s probability of being involved 
in the securitization activities. We run the probit regressions with all of our BHC risk measures 
with year fixed effect. We then calculate each BHC’s propensity score based on the probability 
that a BHC with given characteristics actively involved in securitization. With the computed 
propensity score, we match securitizing BHCs with non- securitizing BHCs (using the nearest 
neighbors and matching within a 0.01 caliper). Lastly, we implement univariate tests to compare 
the difference in mean institutional ownership between the treated and the matched sample for 
each of the 4 quarters leading up to the crisis as well as the whole pre-crisis period. We report the 
univariate test results in Table 2.4.12 The results show that independent institutions sell more BHCs 
reporting non-zero mortgage or asset securitization than they sell control group BHCs before the 
crisis, with a difference in mean institutional ownership of 4.77% and 5% respectively. In contrast,
                                                          
12 For brevity, we only report second stage results for PSM and IV regressions here, first stage 
results are available upon request.  
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Table 2.4 Institutional ownership and bank securitization: propensity score matching 
Panel A. Mean difference in institutional ownership using mortgage securitization dummy  
  IO_Grey  IO_Indp 
 2006Q3 2006Q4 2007Q1 2007Q2 Pre-Crisis  2006Q3 2006Q4 2007Q1 2007Q2 Pre-Crisis 
Observations 387 380 374 372 1,513  387 380 374 372 1,513 
ATT -2.214 -2.381 1.107 -0.809 -0.409  -4.618 -6.194 -1.559 -0.532 -4.774 
T-value -1.009 -1.101 0.509 -0.366 -0.349  -0.898 -1.348 -0.299 -0.0963 -1.706* 
Panel B. Mean difference in institutional ownership using aggregate asset securitization dummy  
 IO_Grey  IO_Indp 
 2006Q3 2006Q4 2007Q1 2007Q2 Pre-Crisis  2006Q3 2006Q4 2007Q1 2007Q2 Pre-Crisis 
Observations 387 380 374 372 1,513  387 380 374 372 1,513 
ATT -1.759 -2.199 1.841 -1.147 -1.492  -8.204 -4.162 -4.631 -7.900 -5.000 
T-value -0.837 -0.925 0.847 -0.479 -1.237  -1.625 -0.932 -0.784 -1.256 -1.944* 
Panel C. Mean difference in institutional ownership using PMBS dummy 
 IO_Grey  IO_Indp 
 2006Q3 2006Q4 2007Q1 2007Q2 Pre-Crisis  2006Q3 2006Q4 2007Q1 2007Q2 Pre-Crisis 
Observations 387 380 374 372 1,513  387 380 374 372 1,513 
ATT -0.503 -0.660 -2.662 -1.265 -1.535  -0.320 -0.795 -2.468 2.112 0.464 
T-value -0.432 -0.501 -1.940* -0.944 -2.090**   -0.151 -0.350 -1.062 0.981 0.398 
Notes: In this table, we report the mean difference in institutional ownership between BHCs with high exposure to securitization and 
BHCs with no exposure to securitization using Propensity Score Matching. We examine each of the four quarters immediately prior to 
the crisis and the four-quarter period as a whole. In the first stage, we run Probit regression with one of the securitization measure 
dummies being the department variable, and all our control variables as independent variables along with date fixed effect. The three 
securitization dummies we use are: PMBSD, equals 1 if a BHC reports nonzero PMBS and 0 otherwise, SCT_MGGD, equals 1 if a 
BHC reports nonzero mortgage securitization and 0 otherwise; SCT_ALLD, equals 1 if a BHC reports nonzero aggregate asset 
securitization and 0 otherwise. We then conduct propensity score matching (PSM) based on the results we obtain from Probit regressions, 
using the nearest-neighbor and a caliper of 0.01. We conduct mean difference t-tests on grey institutional ownership and independent 
institutional ownership between the treated sample and matched sample for each of the 4 quarters prior to crisis as well as the whole 
year prior to crisis. To save space, we only report the mean difference here. Panel A provides the results using mortgage securitization 
dummy, Panel B provides the results using aggregate asset securitization dummy and Panel C provides the results using PMBS dummy. 
We cluster standard error at BHC level to allow for intragroup correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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grey institutions sell significantly more BHCs reporting non-zero PMBS than they sell control 
group BHCs before the crisis with a difference in mean institutional ownership of 1.5%. 
To further address the concern of endogeneity and reverse causality, we resort to 
instrumental variable (IV) regressions. Admittedly, it is challenging to find valid instrumental 
variables based on economic theory that predict a BHC’s securitization decision but not its 
institutional ownership. Nevertheless, we choose five macroeconomic variables as our excluded 
instrumental variables:  real disposable personal income, average number of households over the 
quarter, average number of marriages, and the average growth rate in the number of mortgage 
applications, and total deposits the BHC holds. Intuitively, we expect higher disposable income, 
higher number of households and number of marriages and faster growth in mortgage applications 
and lower deposits available would put more pressure on BHCs to securitize assets to meet the 
liquidity needs and loan demand.  
We report the second-stage regression results in Table 2.5. From Column 1 through 
Column 3, we investigate the institutional ownership of grey institutions and from Column 4
through Column 6, we investigate the institutional ownership of independent institutions. The 
results again confirm that both grey and independent institutions significantly reduce their holdings 
of BHCs with high exposure to mortgage securitization and asset securitization before the crisis 
but only grey institutions significantly reduce their investment in BHCs with high exposure to the 
riskier PMBS. In addition, the overidentification tests cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
excluded instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term but is correlated 




Table 2.5 Institutional ownership and bank securitization: instrumental regression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES IO_Grey IO_Grey IO_Grey IO_Indp IO_Indp IO_Indp 
              
𝑆𝐶𝑇_𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑡 -0.743***   -1.074**   
 (0.228)   (0.467)   
𝑆𝐶𝑇_𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡  -0.779***   -0.965**  
  (0.215)   (0.433)  
𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑡   -2.333***   0.914 
   (0.669)   (1.130) 
       
𝑍_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡−1 -1.782* -2.175** 3.221** -0.940 -1.154 -0.468 
 (1.025) (1.065) (1.496) (2.103) (2.150) (2.527) 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 -0.018 -0.021 0.143*** 0.032 0.031 -0.012 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.047) (0.036) (0.036) (0.080) 
𝑃𝑅𝐹𝑡−1 1.665 1.366 3.182*** -3.990* -4.025* -1.590 
 (1.017) (1.044) (0.999) (2.087) (2.108) (1.688) 
𝐿𝑄𝐿𝑇𝑡−1 1.688** 1.688*** -1.408** -2.834** -3.139** -4.328*** 
 (0.659) (0.633) (0.713) (1.351) (1.279) (1.205) 
𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑡−1 0.217*** 0.368*** 0.102 0.279 0.470** 0.356** 
 (0.083) (0.091) (0.101) (0.170) (0.185) (0.170) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 4.555*** 4.611*** 4.622*** 7.107*** 7.034*** 5.822*** 
 (0.274) (0.271) (0.293) (0.563) (0.548) (0.496) 
𝑄𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 -0.049** -0.051** -0.040* -0.135*** -0.137*** -0.125*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.044) (0.044) (0.040) 
𝑄𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 0.389*** 0.398*** 0.173* 0.085 0.060 -0.161 
 (0.098) (0.097) (0.092) (0.201) (0.196) (0.155) 
𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑡−1 -6.965 16.932 -64.662 162.936* 180.654** 79.706 
 (40.595) (43.318) (41.194) (83.290) (87.483) (69.588) 
𝐷𝑇𝑡−1 -0.864*** -0.693*** -0.844*** -1.258*** -1.047*** -1.268*** 
 (0.138) (0.148) (0.156) (0.284) (0.298) (0.263) 
𝐷𝐻𝑡−1 7.710** 12.721*** -1.565 22.948*** 26.886*** 6.376* 
 (3.905) (4.843) (2.279) (8.011) (9.780) (3.849) 
𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡−1 5.315* 5.345* 20.147*** -15.522*** -14.644** -13.849* 
 (2.851) (2.826) (4.226) (5.850) (5.708) (7.139) 
       
Constant -61.996*** -64.295*** -65.317*** -86.503*** -87.386*** -67.709*** 
 (3.882) (4.164) (4.679) (7.964) (8.410) (7.903) 
       
Observations 1,137 1,137 1,137 1,137 1,137 1,137 
R-squared 0.446 0.431 0.297 0.299 0.303 0.397 
BHC Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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(Table 2.5 continued)     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES IO_Grey IO_Grey IO_Grey IO_Indp IO_Indp IO_Indp 
Sargan-
Hansen Stat 3.563 0.641 1.666 0.388 0.752 1.671 
P-Value 0.168 0.726 0.435 0.824 0.686 0.434 
Notes: In this table, we provide the regression results using instrumental regression approach. In each 
of the regressions, we treat the securitization measures as endogenous variable. In the first-stage, we 
regress one of our securitization measure measures on the included control variables as well as four 
excluded instrument variables: DPINC, NHOUS, NMARR, GRMGGN, Deposit; and then we include 
the predicted values in the second-stage as independent variables along with other controls. DPINC is 
quarterly real disposable personal income; NHOUS is the average number of households over the 
quarter; NMARR is average number of marriages during the quarter; and GRMGGN is the average 
growth rate in the number of mortgage applications over the quarter and Deposit is total deposits over 
total assets. Descriptive statistics for the instrumental variables are provided in Appendix D. All other 
independent variables are as defined in Table 2.1. We cluster standard error at BHC level to allow for 
intragroup correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
2.4.3 Institutional trading in BHCs prior to the 2008 Financial Crisis: banks and insurance companies 
In our analysis so far, we include both banks and insurance companies in grey institutions. We use this 
section to investigate whether banks and insurance companies behave differently when investing in 
BHCs before the crisis. We report the results in Table 2.6. The selling in BHCs in general before the 
crisis documented in Table 2.3 seems to be dominated by “bank” type institutions. Though independent 
institutions reduce their holdings in BHCs with high-exposure to mortgage or asset securitization, both 
banks and insurance companies significantly reduce BHCs reporting high level of PMBS in each of the 
four quarters before the crisis hit. However, the magnitude appears to be larger for banks than for 
insurance companies. 
2.4.4 Institutional ownership and deal quality  
In last section, we have shown that institutional investors reduce their holdings in high-exposure BHCs 
before the crisis hit. In particular, the reduction of grey institution holdings is more profound in BHCs 
that report higher level of PMBS on their balance sheet. However, high securitization level doesn’t 
necessarily lead to high risk or deterioration of balance sheet for a BHC if risk is appropriately  
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 Table 2.6 Institutional ownership and BHC securitization for banks and insurance companies 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SCTt: SCT_MGG SCG_ALL PMBS SCT_MGG SCG_ALL PMBS 
Dependent Var: IO_Banks IO_Banks IO_Banks IO_IC IO_IC IO_IC 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑡 0.034** 0.032** 0.064 0.025*** 0.037*** 0.030 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.061) (0.009) (0.013) (0.021) 
Dummy [1 for 2006Q3] 0.130* 0.122 0.254*** 0.102*** 0.095*** 0.142*** 
 (0.076) (0.077) (0.097) (0.033) (0.032) (0.037) 
Dummy [1 for 2006Q4] 0.748*** 0.737*** 0.872*** 0.094** 0.093** 0.123*** 
 (0.114) (0.115) (0.127) (0.041) (0.041) (0.045) 
Dummy [1 for 2007Q1] -0.469*** -0.476*** -0.359*** 0.006 0.009 0.073 
 (0.129) (0.129) (0.134) (0.046) (0.046) (0.050) 
Dummy [1 for 2007Q2] -0.503*** -0.512*** -0.411*** -0.024 -0.026 0.071 
 (0.091) (0.091) (0.099) (0.043) (0.044) (0.047) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑡 ∗ -0.000 0.006 -0.123** -0.041*** -0.028*** -0.078*** 
Dummy [1 for 2006Q3] (0.023) (0.020) (0.056) (0.013) (0.010) (0.021) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑡 ∗] 0.020 0.028 -0.108* -0.032** -0.023* -0.061** 
Dummy [1 for 2006Q4 (0.019) (0.018) (0.060) (0.014) (0.012) (0.024) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑡 ∗ -0.011 0.003 -0.119** -0.006 -0.006 -0.073*** 
Dummy [1 for 2007Q1] (0.021) (0.022) (0.057) (0.013) (0.012) (0.023) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑡 ∗ -0.021 -0.005 -0.107** 0.018 0.016 -0.079*** 
Dummy [1 for 2007Q2] (0.026) (0.025) (0.051) (0.013) (0.013) (0.024) 
𝑍_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡−1 -0.036 -0.038 -0.041 -0.060 -0.060 -0.064 
 (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
𝑃𝑅𝐹𝑡−1 0.183** 0.184** 0.181** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
𝐿𝑄𝐿𝑇𝑡−1 -0.208*** -0.208*** -0.208*** -0.078*** -0.079*** -0.076*** 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) 
𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑡−1 0.138*** 0.137*** 0.141*** 0.025** 0.024* 0.027** 
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(Table 2.6 continued)       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SCTt: SCT_MGG SCG_ALL PMBS SCT_MGG SCG_ALL PMBS 
Dependent Var: IO_Banks IO_Banks IO_Banks IO_IC IO_IC IO_IC 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 1.990*** 1.994*** 1.999*** 0.253** 0.255** 0.250** 
 (0.344) (0.342) (0.343) (0.119) (0.117) (0.121) 
𝑄𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑄𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑡−1 0.318 0.204 0.518 -2.209** -2.388*** -2.086** 
 (2.654) (2.651) (2.656) (0.932) (0.896) (0.944) 
𝐷𝑇𝑡−1 -0.337*** -0.331*** -0.329*** -0.163*** -0.161*** -0.157*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.054) (0.021) (0.018) (0.024) 
𝐷𝐻𝑡−1 0.769 0.662 0.879 0.118 0.007 0.207 
 (1.227) (1.221) (1.222) (0.379) (0.393) (0.377) 
𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡−1 1.235 1.189 1.347 0.108 0.005 0.204 
 (1.187) (1.186) (1.172) (0.331) (0.324) (0.331) 
Constant -24.554*** -24.604*** -24.651*** -2.695 -2.745* -2.644 
 (4.824) (4.804) (4.824) (1.687) (1.663) (1.714) 
Observations 19,388 19,388 19,388 19,388 19,388 19,388 
Number of BHCs 674 674 674 674 674 674 
Date Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.579 0.577 0.581 0.282 0.320 0.289 
Notes: we presents the results from regressions of ownership of bank-type institutions and insurance company-type institutions 
on BHC risk measures, dummy variables for the 4 quarters leading up to the crisis, one of our securitization level measures, 
as well as the interactions of securitization measure and dummy variables. IO_Banks represents the aggregate ownership from 
bank-type institutional investors and IO_IC represents insurance company-type institutions. All independent variables are 
defined as in Table 2.1. To save space, we only provide the results using continuous securitization measures but provide the 
results using securitization dummies in the Appendix F. We cluster standard error at BHC level to allow for intragroup 
correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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controlled when securitizing mortgages. To further capture BHCs’ risk exposure to securitization 
activities, we re-examine the institutional ownership regressions by including mortgage securitization 
deal quality. We match sample BHCs with the securitization deals they issue in BBx data and collect 
five different deal quality measures for each matched deal: documentation level, loan sector, owner-
occupancy, FIICO and combined loan-to-value (CLTV). The higher the first four measures, or the 
lower the last measure, the better the quality of a deal. Also after examining the data, we find that some 
deals are missing FICO or CLTV, we thus create two dummies to represent deals missing FICO or 
CLTV. Previous studies have found evidence that deals with missing critical quality information 
perform worse. The results are reported in Table 2.7.  
We investigate grey and securitization deal quality in Panel A. The results suggest that grey 
institutions become more cautious about deal quality before the crisis and adjust their holdings 
accordingly. For example, they tilt their investment towards BHCs that issue deals with higher 
documentation and higher owner-occupied properties during the four quarters before the crisis. 
They also try to avoid BHCs that issue deals with missing FICO or CLTV.  
In contrast, the results in Panel B show that independent institutions seem to be less informed 
about BHCs’ risk exposure to the securitization deals these BHCs issue. Independent institutions 
move to BHCs that issue deals with lower documentation level, lower rating, lower owner-
occupied properties and missing CLTV before the crisis. They also react positively to deals 
missing FICO score. Missing CLTV does affect independent institutional ownership negatively 




Table 2.7 Institutional ownership and securitization deal quality 
Panel A. Grey institutions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
𝐷𝑂𝐶𝑡−1 -0.236     
 (0.172)     
𝐷𝑂𝐶𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 2007Q2] 1.979***     
 (0.376)     
𝐿𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑡−1  0.724***    
  (0.131)    
𝐿𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 2007Q2]  0.070    
  (0.415)    
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑡−1   -1.094***   
   (0.336)   
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 2007Q2]   2.769***   
   (0.773)   
𝐹𝐼𝐶𝑂𝑡−1    -0.002  
    (0.002)  
𝐹𝐼𝐶𝑂𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 2007Q2]    -0.008  
    (0.006)  
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐼𝐶𝑂𝑡−1    -3.695**  
    (1.635)  
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐼𝐶𝑂𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 2007Q2]    -5.135  
    (4.279)  
𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑉𝑡−1     0.059*** 
     (0.014) 
𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑉𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 2007Q2]     -0.032 
     (0.024) 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑉𝑡−1     -1.614*** 
     (0.380) 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑉𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 2007Q2]     -0.863 
     (0.672) 
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(Table 2.7 continued)      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Dummy [1, if a deal was issued during 
2006Q3 to 2007Q2] -0.782 3.469*** 1.621** 8.392** 6.388*** 
 (0.881) (0.922) (0.706) (3.943) (2.146) 
𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 2007Q2] -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Constant 24.753*** 19.102** 20.156*** 39.712*** 13.588* 
 (7.941) (7.502) (7.643) (7.898) (7.801) 
      
Observations 1,456 1,456 1,456 1,456 1,456 
Adjusted R2 0.665 0.664 0.661 0.689 0.664 
Time Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B. Independent institutions 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
            
𝐷𝑂𝐶𝑡−1 0.001     
 (0.002)     
𝐷𝑂𝐶𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 2007Q2] -0.018***     
 (0.005)     
𝐿𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑡−1  -0.001    
  (0.001)    
𝐿𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 2007Q2]  -0.017***    
  (0.004)    
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑡−1   0.022***   
   (0.004)   
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(Table 2.7 continued)      
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
      
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 2007Q2]   -0.058***   
   (0.014)   
𝐹𝐼𝐶𝑂𝑡−1    0.000***  
    (0.000)  
𝐹𝐼𝐶𝑂𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 2007Q2]    -0.000  
    (0.000)  
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐼𝐶𝑂𝑡−1    0.036**  
    (0.014)  
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐼𝐶𝑂𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 2007Q2]    0.045  
    (0.045)  
𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑉𝑡−1     -0.000 
     (0.000) 
𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑉𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 2007Q2]     0.000 
     (0.000) 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑉𝑡−1     -0.009** 
     (0.004) 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑉𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 2007Q2]     0.057*** 
     (0.009) 
      
Dummy [1, if a deal was issued during 
2006Q3 to 2007Q2] 0.034** 0.025*** 0.035*** -0.004 -0.024 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.040) (0.025) 
𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000* -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 2007Q2] 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Constant 1.047*** 1.090*** 1.063*** 1.069*** 1.091*** 
 (0.086) (0.084) (0.082) (0.088) (0.082) 
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(Table 2.7 continued)      
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
      
Observations 1,456 1,456 1,456 1,456 1,456 
Adjusted R2 0.972 0.972 0.973 0.972 0.974 
Time Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: In this table, we rerun the regressions of institutional ownership on various deal quality measures and control variables 
for grey institutions and independent institutions separately. Deal quality measures are from BBx Data. FICO is the average 
FICO score for all mortgages in one deal; DOC is the average documentation level for all loans in one deal; CLTV is the 
average combined loan-to-value for all mortgages in one deal; LSEC is the proportion of prime mortgages in the deal; Owner 
is the proportion of owner-occupied properties in the deal. For some deals, FICO information is missing, when this happens, 
we assign a value of 0 to such deals’ FICOs and also create a dummy variable (MissFICO), which takes value of one for deals 
missing FICO and zero otherwise. For some deals, CLTV information is missing, in this case, we assign a value of 100 to 
these deals’ CLTVs and also create a dummy variable (MissCLTV), which takes value of one for deals with no CLTV and 
zero otherwise. In Panel A, we examine the ownership of grey institutions; and in Panel B, we examine the ownership of 
independent institutions. We include time-fixed and BHC-fixed effects to control for non-observable heterogeneities among 
BHCs and different years. To save space, we do not report the coefficients on control variables. The results separating banks 
and insurance companies are provided in Appendix G. We cluster standard error at BHC level to allow for intragroup 
correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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2.4.5 Event study of Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy and ex post profitability 
Our results so far suggest that both grey and independent institutions reduce their holdings in high-
exposure BHCs prior to the crisis. However, grey institutions with their potential business ties with 
the BHCs as well as their experience in similar business lines to BHCs show greater concern than 
independent institutions. We interpret the observed difference as grey institutions are better 
informed than independent institutions in terms of the risk exposure of the banks they invest. 
However, one may argue that independent institutions are not necessarily less informed, instead 
they actively seek risk in hope of picking mis-priced banks/secrutization deals for higer returns. In 
this subsection, we provide additional tests on whether grey institutions indeed have more 
information about BHCs than do independent institutions. 
  We investigate whether institutional trading over the four quarters leading up to the crisis 
can predict the BHCs’ abnormal returns for the 3-day window around Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy. We take Lehman Brothers bankruptcy as the one of the clearest signals of the housing 
market meltdown and excessive risk-taking in securitization deals. If institutional investors have 
anticipated the crisis and are able to identify the BHCs that were more aggressive in securitizing 
assets, their tradings in these BHCs should predict the BHCs’ stock performance around the event. 
We thus regress abnormal stock returns around Lehman bankruptcy on institutional tradings prior 
to the crisis and their interaction terms with BHCs’ exposure to securitization before the crisis. 
Panel A of Table 2.8 reports the regression results of BHCs’ abnormal event returns on 
institutional trading as well as their interaction terms with PMBS trading. If institutions have sold 
BHCs that are expected to perform worse during the Lehman event, we should expect positive 
coefficients on the pre-crisis trading. We find that the tradings of both grey institutions and 
independent institutions before the crisis have some predicting power on BHCs’ stock performance 
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around Lehman bankruptcy. However, the trading of grey institutions can better predict high-
exposure BHCs’ stock performance. For example, two interaction terms between grey institutional 
trading and mortgage securitization measure turn out to be positive and significant during the pre-
crisis period, one interaction terms between grey institutional trading and aggregate asset 
securitization measure turns out to positive and significant during the pre-crisis period, and two 
interaction terms between grey institutional trading and private-label MBS turn out to positive and 
significant. In comparison, only one interaction term of independent institutional trading and 
PMBS turns out to be positive and significant while one interaction term of independent 
institutional trading and aggregate asset securitization is actually negative and significant.     
Panel B reports the one-year long term abnormal stock performance of BHCs following 
the Lehman event. If the trading of any types of institutions is driven by information they possess 
instead of the negative liquidity shock they experience, we should not observe any reversal in the 
long-run. Though the trading of grey institution in high-exposure BHCs during 2006Q3 is negative 
and significant with mortgage and aggregate securitization measure, we see more positive and 
significant coefficients in later quarters. The results suggest not only there’s no strong evidence 
for price reversal based on grey institutional tradings before the crisis, their tradings during the 
pre-crisis period are actually further confirmed by the long-run performance.   
As an additional robustness check of the information hypothesis, we also examine BHCs’ 
operating performance (ROA) during crisis in Table 2.9. Again, the tradings of grey institutions 
on high exposure BHCs have better predicted power than those of independent institutions. 
However, grey institutions do not appear to know low exposure BHCs better than do independent 
institutions as none of the stand-alone trading terms turn out to be significant for grey institutions 
while one stand-alone trading term is positive and significant for independent institutions. The
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  Table 2.8 Pre-crisis institutional trading and stock return around Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy 
Panel A. Abnormal returns around Lehman Bankruptcy (-1 day, +1 day) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Grey institutions Independent institution 
VARIABLES SCT_MGG SCT_ALL PMBS SCT_MGG SCT_ALL PMBS 
              
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 -0.068 0.047** 0.138** 0.031* 0.029 0.068 
 (0.048) (0.019) (0.058) (0.018) (0.018) (0.079) 
CHGIO_2006Q3 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CHGIO_2006Q4 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.002 0.003 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CHGIO_2007Q1 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.006** 0.007*** 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
CHGIO_2007Q2 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗  0.014 -0.029 0.071** 0.013 0.014 0.090* 
CHGIO_2006Q3 (0.027) (0.020) (0.032) (0.015) (0.014) (0.047) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠*  0.056** -0.010 0.005 -0.010 -0.006** -0.026 
CHGIO_2006Q4 (0.027) (0.013) (0.036) (0.016) (0.003) (0.029) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠*  0.026 0.030** 0.075* -0.024 -0.020 -0.025 
CHGIO_2007Q1 (0.018) (0.015) (0.040) (0.027) (0.013) (0.025) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠*  0.019** 0.008 0.031 0.019 0.012 0.002 
CHGIO_2007Q2 (0.008) (0.006) (0.025) (0.030) (0.012) (0.016) 
       
Constant 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
       
Observations 327 327 327 327 327 327 





(Table 2.8 continued) 
Panel B. Post-Lehman Bankruptcy long run performance (0, +12 months) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Grey institutions Independent institutions 
VARIABLES SCT_MGG SCT_ALL PMBS SCT_MGG SCT_ALL PMBS 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 0.204 -0.313** 0.174 -0.438** -0.363* -0.266 
 (0.525) (0.157) (0.582) (0.206) (0.184) (0.899) 
CHGIO_2006Q3 -0.007 -0.007 -0.038 0.016 0.017 0.031 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.036) (0.032) (0.032) (0.037) 
CHGIO_2006Q4 -0.042 -0.047 -0.034 0.004 0.002 0.001 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.054) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) 
CHGIO_2007Q1 0.033 0.030 0.030 -0.037* -0.038* -0.030 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.050) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) 
CHGIO_2007Q2 -0.042 -0.042 -0.047* -0.033* -0.033* -0.027* 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗  -0.903*** -0.461* 0.610 0.009 -0.034 -0.235 
CHGIO_2006Q3 (0.211) (0.260) (0.382) (0.122) (0.119) (0.485) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠*  -0.345 0.032 -0.329 -0.059 -0.002 0.118 
CHGIO_2006Q4 (0.260) (0.164) (0.441) (0.229) (0.028) (0.314) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠*  0.470*** 0.340** 0.175 -0.200 -0.108 -0.151 
CHGIO_2007Q1 (0.156) (0.132) (0.427) (0.287) (0.118) (0.289) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠*  0.073 0.104** 0.334 0.258 0.173 -0.241 
CHGIO_2007Q2 (0.072) (0.052) (0.224) (0.361) (0.135) (0.201) 
Constant 0.085 0.089* 0.079 0.080 0.081 0.079 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.059) (0.060) (0.061) (0.063) 
Observations 327 327 327 327 327 327 
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.044 0.041 0.044 0.043 0.046 
Notes: In this table we report the regression results of BHCs’ abnormal returns for the 3-day window around Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy on September 15, 2008 on institutional trading in the four quarters leading up to the crisis. We use Carhart 4 factor 
model to estimate the cumulative abnormal returns for each BHC during the 3-day event window. Panel A reports the results 
using abnormal stock returns over the 3-day event window; and Panel B reports the results with one year long-run stock 
performance being the dependent variables. The results separating banks and insurance companies are provided in Appendix H. 
We cluster standard error at BHC level to allow for intragroup correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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results on BHC operating performance provide additional support on the hypothesis that grey 
institutions know high-exposure BHCs better.  
 
Table 2.9 Pre-crisis institutional trading and BHC operating performance during crisis 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Grey Independent 
      
𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 18.442** 35.400*** 
 (8.444) (11.179) 
CHGIO_2006Q3 -0.176 0.174 
 (0.321) (0.194) 
CHGIO_2006Q4 -0.600 0.063 
 (0.367) (0.194) 
CHGIO_2007Q1 -0.329 -0.004 
 (0.354) (0.187) 
CHGIO_2007Q2 -0.017 0.204* 
 (0.179) (0.115) 
𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗CHGIO_2006Q3 -3.686 -6.149** 
 (6.229) (2.552) 
𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗CHGIO_2006Q4 12.606** -2.864 
 (5.652) (4.289) 
𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗CHGIO_2007Q1 2.366 -3.978 
 (5.968) (3.261) 
𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗CHGIO_2007Q2 12.512** -2.515 
 (5.958) (2.082) 
   
Constant 0.832** 0.528 
 (0.367) (0.437) 
   
Observations 396 396 
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(Table 2.9 continued)   
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Grey Independent 
   
Adjusted R2 0.451 0.342 
Notes: this table reports the regression results of cumulative ROA during the crisis on institutional 
trading over the four quarters leading to the crisis. The cumulative ROA is calculated as the sum 
of net income over the crisis period divided by the average size of the BHC during the same period. 
In the regressions, we also include the interaction terms of institutional trading with private-label 
MBS (PMBS) from the pre-crisis period. In order to capture potential future losses related to the 
crisis, we use a longer period from the third quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2009. The 
results using two different crisis definitions are reported in the first two columns and last two 
columns, respectively. The results separating banks and insurance companies are provided in 
Appendix I. We cluster standard error at BHC level to allow for intragroup correlation. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we test whether institutional investors have better information about the BHCs they 
invest. We use the 2008 financial crisis as a major event and examine how institutional investors 
trade in BHCs around the crisis. We divide BHCs into high-exposure BHCs and low-exposure 
BHCs based on their involvement in securitization. We supplement BHCs’ aggregate 
securitization level from FR Y-9C with detailed securitization deal quality measures from BBx 
Data, which contains more than 7,400 private label mortgage securitized deals.  
We find that grey institutions can better identify high-exposure BHCs and reduce their 
holdings more in such BHCs than independent institutions during the four quarters prior to the 
crisis. When we confine the analysis to only securitizing BHCs, we find that grey institutions 
prefer BHCs that issue deals of better quality. In contrast, independent institutions appear to be 
more aggressive before the crisis as they tilt their investment towards BHCs that issue riskier 




Lastly, the trading of both grey institutions and independent institutions immediately 
before the crisis have some power in predicting BHCs’ event day returns surrounding the 
Lehman Bankruptcy, but grey institutions does a much better job in predicting event returns for 
high-exposure BHCs. The pre-crisis trading of grey institutions is also positively related to 
operating performance of high-exposure BHCs during the crisis. Overall, our findings suggest 
that it is unlikely to rely on independent institutions to provide information on BHCs. Although, 
through their trades, grey institutions have revealed perverse information on some high exposure 
BHCs prior to the crisis. The magnitude does not appear to be economically strong enough as a 
pre-warning signal. In sum, our analysis demonstrate that there were concerned institutions 
regarding the risk-taking behaviors of BHCs prior to the crisis. However, it is not systematic 
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Appendix A: Definitions of Variables 
BHC-level variables 
We obtain consolidated financial information of bank holding companies (BHCs) from the FR 
Y-9C reports from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (FRB Chicago). Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York provides PERMCO_RSSD links from January 1, 1990 to September 30, 201213. 
We use this linking table to collect PERMCOs for our sample BHCs and then we obtain stock 
return information of BHCs from CRSP. The expressions in parentheses denote the 
corresponding variable names in the FR Y-9C.  
 Size is natural logarithm of total assets (BHCK2170). 
 LIQ measures a BHC’s balance sheet liquidity, it’s calculated as liquid assets over total 
assets. Liquid assets equals the sum of Fed funds sold and securities purchased under 
agreements to resell (BHCK1350), securities held to maturity (BHCK1754), and 
available for sale securities (BHCK1773) for the period up to 2001Q4. For the period 
starting from 2002Q1, liquid assets equals the sum of BHCKC225, BHCK1754, and 
BHCK1773. From the first quarter of 2002, we use BHCKC225 to account for Fed funds 
sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell. 
 PRF measures a BHC’s profitability, it’s calculated as net income (BHCK4340) over 
total assets (BHCK2170).  
 EQT is equity ratio, calculated as equity capital (BHCK3210) over total assets 
(BHCK2170). 
 EFF is BHC efficiency measures, it’s calculated as noninterest expenses over total assets 
(BHCK2170). 
                                                          
13 "Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 2013. CRSP-FRB Link." 
90 
 
 DT is total gross notional amount of derivative contracts held for trading, obtained adding 
the values of interest rate contracts (BHCKA126), foreign exchange contracts 
(BHCKA127), equity derivative contracts (BHCK8723), and commodity and other 
contracts (BHCK8724) over total assets. 
 DH is total value of derivatives used for hedging purposes (sum of BHCK8725, 
BHCK8726, BHCK8727, and BHCK8728) over total assets.  
 NONINC is the ratio of noninterest income (BHCK4079) over the sum of noninterest and 
interest income (BHCK4079+BHCK4107). 
 LQLT measures a BHC’s loan quality, it’s calculated as the sum of loans past due 90 
days or more (BHCK5525) and loans not accruing (BHCK5526) over total assets. 
 PMBS, private MBS: the total value of private-label mortgage-backed securities held in 
both trading and investment portfolios; it excludes mortgage-backed securities that are 
either issued or guaranteed by government sponsored enterprises. It is calculated as the 
sum of BHCK1709, BHCK1733, BHCK1713, BHCK1736 and BHCK3536. 
 SCT_MGG, the amount of mortgage securitized over total assets. The amount of 
mortgage securitized is obtained by adding outstanding principal balance of assets sold 
and securitized with recourse or other seller-provided credit enhancements – home equity 
lines (BHCKB706) and 1-4 family residential loans (BHCKB705). 
 SCT_ALL, the sum of all securitized assets over total assets. All securitized assets value 
is obtained by adding the values of outstanding principal balance of assets sold and 
securitized with recourse or other seller-provided credit enhancements from the following 
six categories: 1-4 family residential loans (BHCKB705), home equity lines 
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(BHCKB706), credit card receivables (BHCKB707), auto loans (BHCKB708), other 
consumer loans (BHCKB709), and commercial and industrial loans (BHCKB710). 
 Z-score. It equals the return on assets (PRF) plus the capital asset ratio (EQT) divided by 
the standard deviation of asset returns. It captures the number of standard deviations that 
profits must fall to derive a BHC into insolvency.  
 QRET is compounded stock return over the quarter using daily return data.  
 QVOL is quarterly return volatility, calculated as the variance of daily returns over the 
quarter.  
Institutional ownership measures 
We obtain institutional holding data from Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13f) The 
Thomson sets are available on WRDS as part of the Thomson Financial Network (TFN). 
Thomson Financial Spectrum classifies institutions into five types: 1) banks; 2) insurance 
companies; 3) investment companies and their managers; 4) independent investment advisers; 
and 5) others (pension funds, endowments, etc.). Following Chen, Harford, and Li (2007), we 
classify types 3 and 4 as well as public pension funds from type 5 as independent institutions; 
and types 1 and 2 as well as the remaining institutions from type 5 as grey institutions. 
 IO_Total, total institutional ownership. It’s calculated as the ratio of a BHC’s total shares 
held by 13f investors over the BHC’s total shares outstanding.  
 IO_Grey, total institutional ownership from grey institutions. It’s calculated as the ratio 
of a BHC’s total shares held by grey institutions over the BHC’s total shares outstanding. 
 IO_Indp, total institutional ownership from independent institutions. It’s calculated as the 




 CHGIO_Total, the change in total institutional ownership from previous quarter for the 
BHC. 
 CHGIO_Grey, the change in grey institutional ownership from previous quarter for the 
BHC. 
 CHGIO_Indp, the change in independent institutional ownership from previous quarter 
for the BHC. 
Deal quality measures 
We collect various quality measures of securitized mortgage deals from BBx database provided 
by BlackBox Logic. 𝑩𝑩𝒙 𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂𝑻𝑴 includes more than 7,400 deals, 21 million loans and over 
740 million remittance records dating back to 1999. 
 FICO: the average FICO score for all loans in the deal. If a deal doesn’t have FICO score 
information, we assign a value of 0 to the FICO score of for such deals. 
 MissFICO. Dummy variable that takes 1 for deals with missing FICO score and 0 
otherwise. 
 DOC: average documentation level for all loans in the deal. For each mortgage, BBx 
reports one of the documentation status, “Full Documentation (FD)”, “Low 
Documentation (LD)”, “No Documentation (ND)”, “Reduced Documentation (RD)” and 
“Unknown (UN)”. We assign a value of 1 to mortgages with ND or UN, a value of 2 to 
mortgages with RD or LD, and a value of 3 to mortgages with FD. We then compute the 
average documentation level of all mortgages included in one deal as the deal’s average 
documentation level.  
 CLTV: combined loan-to-value. BBx reports the ratio of all loan amounts on the property 
at the time of origination to the property value at loan origination for each mortgage. We 
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compute the mean value of all mortgages include in one deal as deal’s average CLTV. If 
a deal doesn’t have CLTV information, we assign a 100% CLTV to such deals. 
 MissCLTV. Dummy variable that takes 1 for deals with no CLTV information and 0 
otherwise. 
 LSEC: proportion of prime mortgages in the deal. BBx reports the credit sector each 
mortgage belongs, including “Alt-A (AA)”, “Prime (PR)”, “Subprime (SP)”, and 
“Unknown (UN)”. We assign a value of 1 to mortgages with UN or SP, a value of 2 to 
mortgages with AA, and a value of 3 to mortgages with PR. Then we compute the 
average value of all mortgages in one deal as the deal’s average loan sector, the higher 
the value the higher portion of prime mortgages in the deal. 
 Owner: owner occupancy status. BBx provides occupancy types: “Non Owner 
Occupied”, “Other”, “Owner Occupied”, “Second Home”, “Unknown” and “Vacant”. 
We assign a value of 1 to mortgages recorded as “Owner Occupied” and a value of 0 to 
the rest mortgages. We then compute the average value of all mortgages in one deal as 
the deal’s average owner-occupancy. The higher the value, the more properties are 
owner-occupied in the deal.  
 Issue year: the calendar year the deal was formed. 
 Issue Balance: the average issuing balance for the deal.
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Appendix B: List of Public Pension Funds 
MGRNAME  MGRNO 
California Public Employees Retirement System  12000 
California State Teachers Retirement  12120 
California State Teachers Retirement  12100 
Colorado Public Employees Retirement Association  18740 
Florida State Board of Administration  38330 
Illinois State Universities Retirement System  81590 
Kentucky Teachers Retirement System  49050 
Maryland State Retirement and Pension System  54360 
Michigan State Treasury  57500 
Montana Board of Investment  58650 
New Mexico Edu Retirement BD   63600 
New York State Common Retirement Fund  63850 
New York State Teachers Retirement System  63895 
Ohio Public Employees Retirement System  66550 
Ohio School Employees Retirement System  66610 
Ohio State Teachers Retirement System  66635 
Texas Teachers Retirement System  83360 
Texas Teachers Retirement System  82895 
Virginia Retirement System  90803 
State of Wisconsin Investment Board  93405 
Missouri ST Emp Ret SYS   58150 
Pennsylvania Public SCH EMP RE  68830 
Notes: These public pension funds are collectively identified in Cremers and Nair (2005), 
Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2005), and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). The first 
column provides names of public pension funds; and second column provides manager 
numbers in Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13f). 
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Appendix C. Securitization Deal Issuing BHCs and the Number of Deals They 
Issued 
  RSSDID BHC Name # Deals 
1 1039502 J P MORGAN CHASE & CO 202 
2 1068025 KEYCORP NEW 2 
3 1068294 BANK ONE CORP 3 
4 1068762 MELLON FINL CORP 3 
5 1069125 NATIONAL CITY CORP 2 
6 1069778 PNC FINL SVCS GROUP INC 1 
7 1070617 PROVIDENT FINL GROUP INC 2 
8 1073551 WACHOVIA CORP 2ND NEW 4 
9 1073757 BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION 280 
10 1094640 FIRST TENN NATL CORP 161 
11 1120754 WELLS FARGO & CO NEW 280 
12 1129382 POPULAR INC 29 
13 1131787 SUNTRUST BKS INC 1 
14 1888193 WILMINGTON TRUST CORP 15 
15 1951350 CITIGROUP INC 112 
16 2081124 GREENPOINT FINL CORP 3 
17 2277860 CAPITAL ONE FINL CORP 59 
18 2549857 COUNTRYWIDE CR INDS INC DEL 648 
Notes: This table provides the names and RSSDID of mortgage 
securitization deal issuers, along with the number of deals they issue 
during our sample period. 
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Appendix D. Descriptive Statistic for Instrument Variables 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev 25th Pctl 75th Pctl N 
NHOUS 110,983 110,937.8 291.295 110,747 111,219 4 
NMARR 182.417 184.667 38.801 150.833 214 4 
DPINC 35,716 35,806 245.7 35,548.5 35,883.5 4 
GRMGGN 1.181 0.531 3.579 -1.296 3.658 4 
Deposits 0.747 0.765 0.099 0.699 0.814 1631 
Notes: This table reports the descriptive statistics for instrument variables over the 
pre-crisis period. DPINC is quarterly real disposable personal income; NHOUS is 
the average number of households over the quarter in thousands; NMARR is average 
number of marriages during the quarter in thousands; and GRMGGN is the average 
growth rate in the number of mortgage applications over the quarter. All the four 
variables are estimated from data series reported in HIS Global Insight. Loans is 
total loans over total assets, calculated as BHCK2122/BHCK2170; Deposits is total 
deposits over total assets, calculated as the sum of BHDM6631, BHDM6636, 






Appendix E. Grey Institutional Ownership and BHC Exposure to Securitization (Definition 2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SCTt: SCT_MGG SCG_ALL PMBS SCT_MGG SCG_ALL PMBS 
Dependent Var: IO_Grey IO_Grey IO_Grey IO_Indp IO_Indp IO_Indp 
              
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑡 0.043 0.031 -0.187** 0.426 0.245 -0.727** 
 (0.029) (0.026) (0.094) (0.697) (0.631) (0.368) 
Dummy [1 for 2006Q3] 0.542*** 0.557*** 0.648*** 0.679*** 0.682*** 0.845*** 
 (0.134) (0.135) (0.154) (0.152) (0.155) (0.245) 
Dummy [1 for 2006Q4] 1.131*** 1.148*** 1.258*** 1.217*** 1.217*** 1.209*** 
 (0.185) (0.186) (0.203) (0.198) (0.201) (0.288) 
Dummy [1 for 2007Q1] -1.030*** -1.006*** -0.934*** -0.848*** -0.828*** -0.842*** 
 (0.208) (0.210) (0.219) (0.211) (0.216) (0.278) 
Dummy [1 for 2007Q2] -0.780*** -0.758*** -0.570*** -0.600*** -0.607*** -0.853*** 
 (0.171) (0.175) (0.213) (0.183) (0.190) (0.285) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑡 ∗Dummy [1 for 
2006Q3] -0.103*** -0.092*** -0.190*** -2.355*** -2.062*** -0.804** 
 (0.034) (0.027) (0.071) (0.685) (0.642) (0.399) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑡 ∗ Dummy [1 for 
2006Q4] -0.054 -0.058* -0.169** -1.442* -1.252* -0.277 
 (0.034) (0.031) (0.081) (0.816) (0.750) (0.422) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑡 ∗Dummy [1 for 
2007Q1] -0.069 -0.076 -0.143* -2.671*** -2.441*** -0.602 
 (0.057) (0.048) (0.084) (0.940) (0.851) (0.429) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑡 ∗Dummy [1 for 
2007Q2] 0.103 0.061 -0.116 -1.132 -0.840 0.318 
 (0.148) (0.125) (0.076) (1.232) (1.058) (0.473) 
𝑍_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡−1 -0.085 -0.090 -0.085 -0.089 -0.091 -0.079 
 (0.262) (0.262) (0.262) (0.262) (0.262) (0.264) 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 0.044* 0.044* 0.050* 0.044* 0.044* 0.046* 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
𝑃𝑅𝐹𝑡−1 0.203* 0.204* 0.209* 0.201 0.204* 0.210* 
98 
 
 (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.122) 
𝐿𝑄𝐿𝑇𝑡−1 -0.116 -0.116 -0.102 -0.119 -0.117 -0.110 
 (0.147) (0.148) (0.148) (0.148) (0.148) (0.147) 
𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑡−1 0.569*** 0.569*** 0.573*** 0.571*** 0.571*** 0.568*** 
 (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 3.397*** 3.397*** 3.338*** 3.379*** 3.383*** 3.444*** 
 (0.614) (0.615) (0.620) (0.620) (0.618) (0.613) 
𝑄𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 -0.004** -0.004** -0.005** -0.004** -0.004** -0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝑄𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑡−1 7.479* 7.456* 7.594* 7.626* 7.609* 8.500** 
 (4.064) (4.077) (4.025) (4.049) (4.072) (4.045) 
𝐷𝑇𝑡−1 -0.322*** -0.317*** -0.309*** -0.319*** -0.318*** -0.335*** 
 (0.092) (0.094) (0.096) (0.097) (0.097) (0.098) 
𝐷𝐻𝑡−1 -0.613 -0.595 -0.430 -0.544 -0.511 -0.362 
 (1.673) (1.681) (1.717) (1.670) (1.666) (1.677) 
𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡−1 1.983 1.954 2.171 2.081 2.064 2.020 
 (2.287) (2.288) (2.330) (2.311) (2.309) (2.323) 
Constant -47.663*** -47.645*** -46.833*** -47.403*** -47.448*** -47.974*** 
 (8.654) (8.669) (8.744) (8.730) (8.711) (8.681) 
       
Observations 19,388 19,388 19,388 19,388 19,388 19,388 
Number of BHCs 674 674 674 674 674 674 
Date Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.621 0.621 0.612 0.619 0.619 0.618 
Notes: We presents the results from regressions of grey institutional ownership on BHC risk measures, dummy variables for the 4 
quarters leading up to the crisis, one of our securitization level measures, as well as the interactions of securitization measure and 
dummy variables. In this table, we define grey institutions as banks, insurance companies and all non-public pension funds in 
“Type 5” institutions. All independent variables are defined as in Table 3. We include time-fixed and BHC-fixed effects to control 
for non-observable heterogeneities among BHCs and different years. We cluster standard error at BHC level to allow for intragroup 




Appendix F. Institutional Ownership and BHC Securitization Exposure Using Dummy Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SCTt: SCT_MGGD SCG_ALLD PMBSD SCT_MGGD SCG_ALLD PMBSD 
Dependent Variable: IO_Banks IO_Banks IO_Banks IO_IC IO_IC IO_IC 
              
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑡 0.361 0.388 0.378* 0.153 0.199* 0.104* 
 (0.496) (0.445) (0.208) (0.146) (0.103) (0.057) 
Dummy [1 for 2006Q3] 0.150* 0.157* 0.299** 0.130*** 0.122*** 0.218*** 
 (0.086) (0.088) (0.126) (0.036) (0.039) (0.056) 
Dummy [1 for 2006Q4] 0.728*** 0.726*** 0.674*** 0.108** 0.097** 0.230*** 
 (0.122) (0.125) (0.162) (0.043) (0.044) (0.060) 
Dummy [1 for 2007Q1] -0.459*** -0.460*** -0.358** 0.028 0.018 0.197*** 
 (0.130) (0.135) (0.172) (0.047) (0.046) (0.065) 
Dummy [1 for 2007Q2] -0.491*** -0.511*** -0.596*** -0.018 -0.031 0.077 
 (0.095) (0.101) (0.153) (0.046) (0.048) (0.063) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑡 ∗Dummy [1 for 
2006Q3] -0.188 -0.215 -0.354 -0.674*** -0.503** -0.319*** 
 (0.418) (0.383) (0.224) (0.206) (0.211) (0.096) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑡 ∗ Dummy [1 for 
2006Q4] 0.465 0.413 0.195 -0.464* -0.289 -0.349*** 
 (0.520) (0.478) (0.265) (0.248) (0.245) (0.099) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑡 ∗Dummy [1 for 
2007Q1] -0.188 -0.148 -0.218 -0.295 -0.150 -0.415*** 
 (0.527) (0.480) (0.246) (0.245) (0.240) (0.105) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑡 ∗Dummy [1 for 
2007Q2] -0.286 -0.052 0.179 0.115 0.205 -0.175* 
 (0.491) (0.504) (0.249) (0.223) (0.214) (0.105) 
𝑍_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡−1 -0.043 -0.043 -0.049 -0.064 -0.065 -0.066 
 (0.134) (0.134) (0.133) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
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 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
𝑃𝑅𝐹𝑡−1 0.182** 0.184** 0.182** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
𝐿𝑄𝐿𝑇𝑡−1 -0.209*** -0.208*** -0.208*** -0.078*** -0.078*** -0.076*** 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑡−1 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.141*** 0.026** 0.027** 0.027** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 1.972*** 1.966*** 1.961*** 0.243** 0.237* 0.240** 
 (0.349) (0.348) (0.343) (0.120) (0.121) (0.121) 
𝑄𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑄𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑡−1 0.438 0.444 0.026 -2.105** -2.111** -2.223** 
 (2.657) (2.653) (2.697) (0.940) (0.937) (0.951) 
𝐷𝑇𝑡−1 -0.330*** -0.330*** -0.319*** -0.159*** -0.158*** -0.155*** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
𝐷𝐻𝑡−1 0.805 0.822 0.765 0.167 0.173 0.176 
 (1.244) (1.240) (1.222) (0.392) (0.391) (0.388) 
𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡−1 1.312 1.291 1.410 0.183 0.170 0.223 
 (1.187) (1.176) (1.175) (0.336) (0.334) (0.330) 
       
Constant -24.286*** -24.218*** -24.252*** -2.538 -2.462 -2.527 
 (4.893) (4.885) (4.811) (1.705) (1.716) (1.705) 
       
Observations 19,388 19,388 19,388 19,388 19,388 19,388 
Number of BHCs 674 674 674 674 674 674 
Date Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.580 0.580 0.580 0.286 0.292 0.280 
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Appendix G Institutional Ownership and Securitization Deal Quality: Banks and Insurance 
Companies 
Panel A. Banks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
𝐷𝑂𝐶𝑡−1 -0.001     
 (0.001)     
𝐷𝑂𝐶𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 2007Q2] 0.013***     
 (0.003)     
𝐿𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑡−1  0.006***    
  (0.001)    
𝐿𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 2007Q2]  0.002    
  (0.003)    
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑡−1   -0.009***   
   (0.003)   
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 
2007Q2]   0.023***   
   (0.006)   
𝐹𝐼𝐶𝑂𝑡−1    -0.000  
    (0.000)  
𝐹𝐼𝐶𝑂𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 2007Q2]    -0.000  
    (0.000)  
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐼𝐶𝑂𝑡−1    -0.036***  
    (0.014)  
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐼𝐶𝑂𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 
2007Q2]    -0.032  
    (0.032)  
𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑉𝑡−1     0.001*** 
     (0.000) 
𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑉𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 2007Q2]     -0.000** 
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     (0.000) 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑉𝑡−1     -0.012*** 
     (0.003) 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑉𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 
2007Q2]     -0.007 
     (0.005) 
      
Dummy [1, if a deal was issued 
during 2006Q3 to 2007Q2] -0.002 0.022*** 0.009 0.052* 0.064*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.029) (0.016) 
𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 
2007Q2] -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Constant 0.132** 0.102* 0.110* 0.286*** 0.042 
 (0.062) (0.059) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) 
      
Observations 1,456 1,456 1,456 1,456 1,456 
Adjusted R2 0.661 0.665 0.660 0.695 0.666 
Time Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B. Insurance companies 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
𝐷𝑂𝐶𝑡−1 -0.002**     
 (0.001)     
𝐷𝑂𝐶𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 2007Q2] 0.007***     
 (0.001)     
𝐿𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑡−1  0.001*    
  (0.000)    
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𝐿𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 2007Q2]  -0.001    
  (0.001)    
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑡−1   -0.002*   
   (0.001)   
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 
2007Q2]   0.005   
   (0.003)   
𝐹𝐼𝐶𝑂𝑡−1    0.000  
    (0.000)  
𝐹𝐼𝐶𝑂𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 2007Q2]    -0.000  
    (0.000)  
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐼𝐶𝑂𝑡−1    -0.002  
    (0.005)  
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐼𝐶𝑂𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 
2007Q2]    -0.020  
    (0.016)  
𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑉𝑡−1     0.000 
     (0.000) 
𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑉𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 2007Q2]     0.000 
     (0.000) 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑉𝑡−1     -0.004*** 
     (0.001) 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑉𝑡−1 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 
2007Q2]     -0.001 
     (0.003) 
      
Dummy [1, if a deal was issued 
during 2006Q3 to 2007Q2] -0.005 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.032** 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.015) (0.010) 
𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 ∗[1, if 2006Q3 to 
2007Q2] -0.000* -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000** 
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 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Constant 0.127*** 0.101*** 0.103*** 0.125*** 0.105*** 
 (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) 
      
Observations 1,456 1,456 1,456 1,456 1,456 
Adjusted R2 0.798 0.793 0.793 0.796 0.795 
Time Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: In this table, we rerun the regressions of institutional ownership on various deal quality measures and control variables for 
grey institutions and independent institutions separately. Deal quality measures are from BBx Data. We find each deal’s 
prospectus in Edgar and identify the deals whose issuers are our sample bank holding companies. FICO is the average FICO score 
for all mortgages in one deal; DOC is the average documentation level for all loans in one deal; CLTV is the average combined 
loan-to-value for all mortgages in one deal; LSEC is the proportion of prime mortgages in the deal; Owner is the proportion of 
owner-occupied properties in the deal. For some deals, FICO information is missing, when this happens, we assign a value of 0 
to such deals’ FICOs and also create a dummy variable (MissFICO), which takes value of one for deals missing FICO and zero 
otherwise. For some deals, CLTV information is missing, in this case, we assign a value of 100 to these deals’ CLTVs and also 
create a dummy variable (MissCLTV), which takes value of one for deals with no CLTV and zero otherwise. In Panel A, we 
examine the ownership of grey institutions; and in Panel B, we examine the ownership of independent institutions. We include 
time-fixed and BHC-fixed effects to control for non-observable heterogeneities among BHCs and different years. To save space, 
we do not report the coefficients on control variables. We cluster standard error at BHC level to allow for intragroup correlation. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix H. Pre-Crisis Institutional Trading and Stock Return around Lehman  
Brothers Bankruptcy: Banks and Insurance Companies 
Panel A. Abnormal returns around Lehman Bankruptcy (-1 day, +1 day) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Banks Insurance compsnies 
VARIABLES SCT_MGG SCT_ALL PMBS SCT_MGG SCT_ALL PMBS 
              
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 0.031 0.035 0.136* -0.001 0.041* 0.122** 
 (0.066) (0.025) (0.072) (0.034) (0.023) (0.052) 
CHGIO_2006Q3 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007* 0.010 0.009 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) 
CHGIO_2006Q4 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.007 0.014* 0.013 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
CHGIO_2007Q1 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 0.001 0.004 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
CHGIO_2007Q2 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.009 0.009 0.005 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗ 
CHGIO_2006Q3 -0.020 -0.037** 0.090* 0.057*** 0.033* 0.094 
 (0.048) (0.016) (0.046) (0.013) (0.017) (0.065) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠* 
CHGIO_2006Q4 0.017 0.012 -0.019 0.115*** 0.002 0.051 
 (0.028) (0.019) (0.047) (0.039) (0.034) (0.070) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠* 
CHGIO_2007Q1 0.029 0.036** 0.072* 0.052* 0.007 -0.003 
 (0.051) (0.015) (0.037) (0.031) (0.020) (0.071) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠* 
CHGIO_2007Q2 0.013 0.009 0.008 -0.001 -0.009 0.098* 
 (0.015) (0.006) (0.039) (0.014) (0.013) (0.051) 
       
Constant 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 
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 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
       
Observations 327 327 327 327 327 327 
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.144 0.142 0.037 0.037 0.039 
Panel B. Post-Lehman Bankruptcy long run performance (0, +12 months) 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 Banks Insurance companies 
VARIABLES SCT_MGG SCT_ALL PMBS SCT_MGG SCT_ALL PMBS 
              
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 -0.434 -0.672*** -0.148 -0.891*** -0.551*** -0.639 
 (0.693) (0.259) (0.658) (0.307) (0.145) (0.487) 
CHGIO_2006Q3 0.030 0.029 0.004 -0.155 -0.152 -0.187 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.040) (0.126) (0.126) (0.157) 
CHGIO_2006Q4 -0.041 -0.041 -0.024 -0.048 -0.034 -0.065 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.061) (0.090) (0.083) (0.080) 
CHGIO_2007Q1 0.085 0.087 0.094* -0.128 -0.124 -0.160** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.057) (0.081) (0.080) (0.080) 
CHGIO_2007Q2 -0.041 -0.043 -0.048 -0.095* -0.093 -0.109** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.057) (0.056) (0.045) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗ 
CHGIO_2006Q3 -0.544 -0.217 0.426 -0.089 -0.152 0.421 
 (0.562) (0.375) (0.414) (0.227) (0.182) (0.863) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠* 
CHGIO_2006Q4 0.122 0.317 -0.416 -0.125 -0.533** 0.359 
 (0.470) (0.319) (0.535) (0.542) (0.230) (0.602) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠* 
CHGIO_2007Q1 0.227 0.125 -0.210 0.835*** 0.537*** 1.389** 
 (0.373) (0.173) (0.368) (0.271) (0.098) (0.542) 
𝑆𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠* 
CHGIO_2007Q2 -0.042 0.079 0.201 0.319* 0.238* 0.803** 
 (0.259) (0.146) (0.333) (0.165) (0.141) (0.378) 
       
Constant 0.103* 0.105* 0.098 0.055 0.057 0.070 
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 (0.054) (0.054) (0.062) (0.049) (0.049) (0.054) 
       
Observations 327 327 327 327 327 327 
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.052 0.051 0.036 0.034 0.032 
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Appendix I. Pre-crisis Institutional Trading and BHC Operating 
Performance during Crisis: Banks and Insurance Companies 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Banks Insurance companies 
      
𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 36.822*** 32.398*** 
 (11.325) (10.781) 
CHGIO_2006Q3 -0.905*** 0.013 
 (0.345) (1.027) 
CHGIO_2006Q4 -0.066 0.997* 
 (0.379) (0.599) 
CHGIO_2007Q1 -0.854** 0.619 
 (0.388) (0.702) 
CHGIO_2007Q2 -0.037 -0.017 
 (0.216) (0.585) 
𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗CHGIO_2006Q3 9.791* 8.059 
 (5.283) (8.855) 
𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗CHGIO_2006Q4 -4.589 -5.098 
 (4.787) (11.396) 
𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗CHGIO_2007Q1 10.732*** 2.708 
 (3.786) (13.007) 
𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗CHGIO_2007Q2 8.743** 7.046 
 (4.262) (10.764) 
   
Constant 0.432 0.545 
 (0.408) (0.359) 
   
Observations 396 396 
Adjusted R2 0.351 0.304 
Notes: This table reports the regression results of cumulative ROA during the crisis on 
institutional trading over the four quarters leading to the crisis. The cumulative ROA is 
calculated as the sum of net income over the crisis period divided by the average size of the 
BHC during the same period. In the regressions, we also include the interaction terms of 
institutional trading with private-label MBS (PMBS) from the pre-crisis period. In order to 
capture potential future losses related to the crisis, we use a longer period from the third quarter 
of 2007 to the second quarter of 2009. The results using two different crisis definitions are 
reported in the first two columns and last two columns, respectively. We cluster standard error 
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